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Introduction to the deliverable 
 
For deliverable D5.3, the social scientists within the HoNESt project have 
engaged in empirical data collection on the issue of nuclear engagement 
futures. This research is situated within the context of the historical analysis of 
work package 2, which has examined the relationship between civil society and 
the development of the nuclear energy sector across Europe, and work 
package 4, which has identified the social characteristics of risk perception, 
social movements of opposition, policy, civil society and regulatory actors, and 
processes within a range of historical case studies. Within work package 5, the 
social scientists have identified specific principles of engagement and are 
working to develop a Theory of Change both within the broader HoNESt project, 
and for the practices of engagement and decision-making within the nuclear 
energy sector (Whitton, Charnley-Parry, and al. In preparation, Charnley-Parry 
et al. 2017). D5.3 specifically develops a practical methodology to facilitate the 
process of understanding and anticipating change in engagement practices 
over time. 
 
Work packages 2 and 4 have undergone stringent historical and social scientific 
analysis of nuclear energy in society, concerning perceptual and engagement 
issues from the inception of the nuclear industry up to the present day. In work 
package 5 one of the tasks is to qualitatively assess stakeholder 
representatives’ perceptions of nuclear energy and society over time – from 
past to present, and then into the future. We organised a series of three 
workshops to, firstly, communicate the findings of previous work packages and 
stimulate dialogue around the findings of the HoNESt project (work package 6), 
and, secondly, to utilise expertise from a variety of industry, government, non-
governmental organisation, third sector, and citizen-stakeholder groups, to 
assess the heterogeneous perspectives on societal and political dimensions of 
nuclear history, to think through contemporary debates around engagement 
practices in the industry and to think forward to how engagement practices and 
policies should (and could) be changed in the future.  
 
Futures studies 
Projecting the analysis of nuclear engagement with society into the future is a 
highly complex problem area, involving multiple competing interests, problems 
of imagination, and limits to rational deliberation. Nuclear energy and its 
relationship to societal engagement is, as previous deliverables have noted 
(Charnley-Parry et al. 2017), a “wicked” problem (Buchanan 1992). It is wicked 
in the sense that the fundamental research questions are difficult to define, 
competing interests are difficult to resolve, and the problem remains perpetually 
resistant to simple policy solutions or interventions (Di Nucci and 
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Brunnengräber 2017, King 1993). The resolution of such wicked problems is 
fundamental goal of the so-called “futures studies” literatures, and work 
package 5.3 of the HoNESt project is situated within this literature. 
 
The social scientific discipline of futures studies is concerned with developing 
an understanding of what is likely to continue, and what could plausibly change 
within a given time frame (Boyer 1975). This involves postulating possible, 
probable, and preferable futures, and in some cases, so called wildcard futures 
(Hiltunen 2006, Steinmüller 2003). The latter are defined sometimes as black 
swan events (Taleb 2007) – low probability, high impact events that are difficult 
to predict because they go beyond common norms of risk management and 
prediction. These are futures created by so-called “unknown unknowns” (to 
borrow Donald Rumsfeld’s expression) – they appear unexpectedly and policy 
authorities commonly claim that they could never have been predicted 
(Shrader-Frechette 2011, Hoffman-Riem and Wynne 2002). 
 
Futures studies, though a relatively modern social scientific discipline, has its 
antecedents in a long history of human thought. Ancient Greek philosophers 
(with Plato’s Republic being the outstanding example: e.g. Ross 2001) 
encouraged individuals to project their thinking and utilise basic methods of 
planning and foresight. Thomas More, building on the groundwork of The 
Republic published Utopia in 1516 (More and Turner 1965). Though later 
interpreted as political satire, the concept of utopia combines "eu," meaning 
good, and "topos," meaning place (Goodey 1970). More developed an 
imaginary society that some interpreted as a blueprint for the future – an ideal 
model of living in which all people's needs are met, poverty is eradicated, and 
individuals experience happiness and fulfilment (Mannheim 2013, Jameson 
2005). Though illusive, the concept of utopia as an ideal, one in which a better 
society can first be imagined, planned and created, has had a powerful effect 
upon the political imagination. And though commonly recognized as 
unachievable, utopian thinking about perfecting society of the future through 
planning in the present, remains an important phenomenon for social scientific 
research. 
When it comes to technological development over time, utopia is a vitally 
important concept for examining how imagined technological futures shape 
political action to achieve desirable social objectives. Of note in this regard is 
the work of Buckminster Fuller (1969) who proposed a technological utopianism 
and set out to create designs for cars and houses that might help lead to such a 
utopia. As discussed across the short country reports (SCRs) and the 
secondary analysis across different countries (Konrad et al. 2018), from the 
Atoms for Peace rhetoric in the 1950s onwards, nuclear power was socially 
constructed in technological utopianist terms - the technology was promoted as 
a means to alleviate energy poverty, facilitate rural electrification, and ensure 
energy security, as well as (in some cases) to produce plutonium to defend 
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national interests (see in particular Freeman 2010, Weart 1988, Duffy 1997). 
However, also of concern is its counterpoint – technological dystopia which 
concerns itself with and focuses commonly on the negative effects caused by 
new technology (Rushkoff 2002). With global crises ranging from catastrophic 
climate change, ocean acidification, biodiversity loss, ocean plastic waste, 
biological, cyber-war or nuclear armed conflict, media reporting and civil society 
dialogue around such catastrophic existential risks, suggests that humanity is 
entering a period of long-term socio-technological decline into unsustainable 
and un-liveable dystopian futures. In relation to nuclear energy, this discourse is 
found in newspaper representations, whereby the technology is described using 
negative language drawn from a source domain of apocalypse, devastation and 
sickness (Renzi et al. 2017). The perception of dangers and dysfunctions 
inherent to technological progress are therefore equally (if not even more) 
motivating as those of technological utopianism. This is because the motivation 
to avoid future dangers is matched by the human need to create plans and 
move forward (Slaughter 2003). Thus, we find that when decision-makers 
imagine the future of a technology they will often to present futures in binary 
utopian/dystopian terms, and then tend to gravitate towards one these polar 
extremes (Keulartz et al. 2004, Rodríguez. 2014, Maroto-Valer 2017). How to 
learn from and balance between the idealised extremes of utopian and 
dystopian thinking to develop a more pragmatic “middle ground” for effective 
civic engagement with risk bearing technologies such as those involved in 
nuclear energy production is therefore worthy of empirical research (see for 
example Sjöberg 2006). At the point of a nuclear renaissance (Nuttall 2004, 
Darst and Dawson 2010), whereby there is interest across Europe in renewing 
nuclear energy through 3rd and 4th generation reactor designs under conditions 
of climate change mitigation, global competitiveness and security of energy 
supply concerns in an increasingly electrified society, understanding how such 
positive and negative imaginings of technological futures is an important 
research task. D5.3 aims to address how such futures can be imagined and 
evaluated, by drawing upon the expertise of nuclear industry, academic and 
citizen-stakeholders. 
 
Concepts in future studies 
It is important to note that futures studies as a social scientific discipline tends to 
differ in its approach to modelling future systems from those found in the 
mathematical, physical and natural sciences. In the latter disciplines, relatively 
narrowly specified systems are often studied (e.g. through predictive, logistic 
regression or Bayesian models). Modelling is commonly applied to predict how 
nuclear energy systems/infrastructures will adapt under differently defined 
socio-economic, technological and environmental conditions (for example: 
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Vaillancourt et al. 2008, Omri and Chaibi 2014, Samaras and Victoria 2008, 
Ashley et al. 2014). The discipline of futures studies, however, often concerns 
larger, more abstract, inter-dependent and ‘fuzzier’ systems - the aim is to 
understand the interrelated complexities between technological design, policy, 
and civic engagement, as is the case here.  
 
With regards to nuclear energy, we posit that such systems are fundamentally 
sociotechnical - in the sense that they are composed of both technical and 
human elements which operate in concert with one another to create an 
emergent system (one that is ‘greater than the sum of its parts’). In the social 
scientific discipline of Science and Technology Studies (STS), sociotechnical 
systems such as nuclear energy facilities can be variously understood as 
imaginaries (Jasanoff and Kim 2009, Molyneux-Hodgson and Hietala 2015), 
actor-networks (Cotton 2015, Ruuska et al. 2009), assemblages (Müller 2015), 
or entanglements (Shackley and Green 2007). Though these concepts are to 
some extent epistemologically distinct, they are very similar ways to understand 
such systems. First, each concept seeks to understand how a system such as a 
nuclear power station has been socially constructed - in the sense that it is not 
solely a technical system composed of material elements, but rather is shaped 
by human action and thought. Sociotechnical systems are understood to be 
interpreted through histories, social biases and heuristics. There is no isolated 
technical system that exists independently of these psycho-social dimensions. 
Second, the future development of nuclear energy is dependent not only upon 
design efficiency, resource availability and technical expertise; but also upon 
broader forces that influence the technology and its use. These are socio-
cultural, economic and political and include (but are not limited to) social 
movements of opposition, media bodies that communicate economic and risk 
information, fossil fuel prices, public perceptions of the environmental impacts, 
health and socio-economic consequences, and the preferences of policymakers 
that are (in the context of democratic systems) heavily influenced by 
constituents’ interests and geopolitical concerns (Brexit being a notable 
contemporary example). 
The social science of nuclear energy has illustrated the various interrelated 
sociotechnical dimensions. Firstly, this includes issues of how nuclear power is 
perceived in relation to radiological risk perception across the nuclear fuel cycle 
(Jenkins-Smith and Silva 1991, Wynne 1993, Parkhill et al. 2010, Sjöberg 2003, 
Espluga Trenc et al. 2017), how issues of catastrophic risks are interpreted and 
negotiated (Shrader-Frechette 2011, Perrow 1999, Oughton et al. 2003), and 
how nuclear accidents such as those at Chernobyl and Fukushima-Daichii are 
reported in the news media and interpreted in global energy policy contexts 
(Renzi et al. 2017, Hasegawa 2012, Joscow and Parsons 2012, Kim, Kim, and 
Kim 2013, Shrader-Frechette 2012, World Nuclear Association 2012, Wynne 
1989, Gould 1990). Secondly, it concerns how energy prices, technological 
innovations, market mechanisms and other techno-economic phenomena 
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influence political decision-making (Greenhalgh and Azapagic 2009, Munro 
2013, Sovacool and Valentine 2012, Markard and Truffer 2006, Adamantiades 
and Kessides 2009, Rubio-Varas and De la Torre 2017). Thirdly, it concerns 
how nuclear energy policy processes evolve within democratic systems through 
the actions of internal policy networks, regulatory bodies, and external actors 
such as industry organisations, lobby groups and environmental non-
governmental organisations (Blowers and Pepper 1988, Carter 1989, Nowlin 
2016, Jahn and Korolczuk 2012, Duffy 1997, Sovacool and Valentine 2012) and 
how practices of social engagement with social, psychological and ethical 
dimensions through participatory-deliberative decision-making influence policy 
outcomes (Espluga et al. 2018, Johnstone 2014, Whitton et al. 2016, Warburton 
2009, Cotton 2017, 2009, O'Connor and van den Hove 2001, Whitton et al. 
2015, Konrad et al. 2018, Atherton 2001).  
 
One of the major driving forces behind the development of new nuclear build 
across the world is the urgent issue of anthropogenic climate change. The rapid 
decarbonisation of electricity systems is the key energy policy priority within 
Europe: across the Member States there is deliberation about the role that 
nuclear power might play within this (Bern and Winkel 2013, Bickerstaff et al. 
2008). One of the key concepts that has emerged is the so-called reluctant 
acceptance (Bickerstaff et al. 2008) of nuclear power to resolve climate change 
given the aforementioned sociocultural barriers arising from negative socio-
economic and perceptual issues that commonly emerge within civil society. 
Reluctance is described as a sense within policy networks that progress on 
developing nuclear energy will be slow and expensive due to public opposition, 
environmental regulation and externalities such as waste and decommissioning 
costs, but nevertheless the urgency of decarbonising electricity systems to meet 
legally binding greenhouse gas emission (GHG) reduction targets forces such a 
move. Understanding how these twin aspects of “reluctance” and “renaissance” 
play out in the development of nuclear power as a global sociotechnical system 
is, therefore, a key area of futures research, and one that we address within this 
report. 
 
Typologies of future studies research 
 
The discipline of futures studies is heterogeneous. In the early 20th century, HG 
Wells used the term foresight to describe and analyse the patterns of stability 
and change that would emerge within technological societies. The concept of 
strategic foresight defined this early field. Sometimes the term futurology is 
used to describe this kind of futures thinking, though the term has fallen away 
as few now regard it as a pure science.  
 
Futures studies can be defined in relation to three problems. The first is to 
examine either possible, probable, or preferable futures, including futures that 
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are utopian, dystopian, or ‘wild card’ (characterized as a low probability high 
impact events) and the conditions under which these might arrive. The second 
is to gain a broad, systemic and holistic view of futures based upon an 
interdisciplinary evaluation of multiple academic disciplines. Third, future studies 
can unpack the assumptions that drive dominant and contending views of the 
future (Masini 2006, Son 2015) - in the present case, to unpack the underlying 
sociotechnical dimensions of a nuclear-powered future. 
 
In order to engage in futures research one must first ask what kind of 
knowledge about the future is most needed (Dreborg 1996)? In the mid 20th 
century in the United States, futures studies as a discipline emerged primarily 
from military strategy during the Cold War. For example, the Society for General 
Systems Research in the 1950s and the RAND Corporation in the 1960s, were 
influential in bringing future studies to the analysis of major policy problems. 
Within the United States at this time, the focus was primarily upon applied 
projects, and upon the application of quantitative tools and systems analysis 
techniques. In Europe, by contrast, there was a preference for investigating the 
long-range future of humanity with regards to ecological limits, in essence, 
asking what future humankind had on Earth. Understanding the environmental 
futures therefore involves understanding symbolic and semantic representations 
as well as the physical resources available. By the 1960s there was an 
increasing influence of academic social science, philosophy, science fiction and 
artistic representation, which began to explore future scenarios and to fashion a 
common dialogue amongst future studies researchers. 
 
By the 1970s there was a clear shift within the discipline towards the use of 
future studies in fields beyond military applications - looking at a wide range of 
technological, social and environmental issues. Problems such as population 
growth, resource availability, energy security, climate change, global poverty, 
biodiversity loss (etc.) came to widespread public attention with the publication 
of Limits To Growth sponsored by the Club of Rome (Meadows et al. 1972). 
The limits to growth research details computer simulations of the future based 
upon economic and population growth statistics and conceptualised future 
scenarios based upon this. It is important to note therefore that since the late 
1970s, futures studies methodologies have incorporated quantitative, qualitative 
and normative ethical elements, and these are treated as mutually reinforcing 
components of futures thinking. Contemporary futures studies literatures are 
therefore concerned with the balancing of competing paradigms and intellectual 
frameworks, qualitative and quantitative methodologies, and synthesising 
pragmatic (and politically useful) lines of evidence upon which to plan industrial 
and environmental policy strategies (Slaughter, Inayatullah, and Ramos 2005, 
Sardar 1999, Dator 2002). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
D5.3: Backcasting futures for nuclear energy and society: a qualitative analysis of European stakeholder 
perspectives 
12 
Probability and predictability 
 
Within the natural sciences some systems are highly predictable and can be 
represented by mathematical models with a high degree of accuracy. However, 
not all physical processes (and certainly few social processes) are easy to 
predict in this manner. Chaos theory, stochastic analysis, and nonlinear science 
deal specifically with “unpredictability” in scientific reasoning. When it comes to 
thinking about long-term futures, there is controversy within the futures studies 
literature. Some believe that as science advances, particularly with the 
development of high-powered computing, algorithmic reliability and artificial 
intelligence, we will continue to improve our understanding of probable futures - 
in essence we will build better predictive models as we can draw more and 
more elements of complexity into a calculable form. Others argue, however, that 
the future is essentially unpredictable and that the best way to predict the future 
is to create it (Bibri 2018, Dreborg 1996, Quist, Thissen, and Vergragt 2011).  
 
Methodologically, within the futures studies literature, predicting the future is 
usually through some form of forecasting analysis. Forecasting extrapolates 
present technological, economic or social trends and tries to predict what the 
future trend will be over a given timeframe. Such techniques have value when 
looking at individual components within a complex system. For example, when 
looking at trends in a particular commodity price, or trends in inflation or interest 
rates, forecasting such changes based upon an understanding of past changes 
under similar conditions has considerable value. However, forecasting is less 
valuable for the examination of sociotechnical systems under conditions of 
uncertainty. This is because the interrelationship between competing trends 
often renders the analysis too ‘noisy’ and hence ineffective as a decision-
making tool (Giljum et al. 2008, Coates et al. 2001). 
 
The discipline of future studies has come to use scenarios in response to the 
limitations of forecasts. A scenario is a possible future rather than a predicted 
future. The practice of scenario development facilitates research into competing 
worldviews and assumptions. One method is the so-called Causal Layered 
Analysis (CLA) method, which involves the creation of prophetic visions of the 
future and then examines how the present can connect with that future 
(Inayatullah 1998). CLA works by identifying the different layers of how a future 
is created. These include social, psychological, discursive, metaphorical, 
economic, environmental, political, resource use, and population layers of the 
future (amongst others). The method then seeks to synchronise these layers in 
order to create a coherent sense of what the new future might be. To connect 
that future to the past and present requires other methods, amongst which 
backcasting analysis is one of the most prominent (Quist 2007).  
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In work package five we employ the concept of backcasting in the examination 
of nuclear engagement futures - in essence, using the method to better 
understand the development of nuclear power as a sociotechnical system over 
time. The backcasting approach involves setting policy goals and then 
determining how those goals might be met. As Dreborg (1996) asserts, 
backcasting utilises a teleological understanding of social systems that doesn’t 
rely upon causal thinking, while forecasting relies entirely on causal analysis, at 
least when interpreted as predictive methodology. Backcasting is a 
methodological tool to examine the complexity of nuclear engagement futures 
by projecting desired futures and then working backwards towards the present 
to imagine how they might be realised. Backcasting was selected due primarily 
to its problem-solving characteristics; more precisely, we adopt the pluralist or 
participatory backcasting approach (Robinson et al. 2011, Quist, Thissen, and 
Vergragt 2011, Tuominen et al. 2014), which differs from the more common 
think-tank approach (which involves main futures work carried out by a research 
group rather than a stakeholder group usually conducted using Delphi or other 
expert-elicitation methods (Robinson 1990, Carlsson-Kanyama et al. 2008), in 
line with HoNESt’s emphasis upon co-produced, stakeholder-led problem 
framing and resolution concurrent with the ethos of HoNESt as a participatory 
research programme (Jasanoff 2004, Brugnach and Ingram 2012). 
 
Backcasting 
 
The concept of backcasting emerged in the work of Robinson (1982), who was 
interested in the literature on so-called soft energy policy paths. Writing in the 
1980s, Robinson was concerned that energy policy analysis was dominated by 
forecasting techniques that extrapolated the economic performance of current 
technologies into the future. With rising concerns over the sustainable 
development of energy systems, the concept of the soft energy path - which 
considers measures such as energy demand reduction and alternative 
technologies (specifically renewables) - became increasingly desirable. Yet 
whilst there was a growing potential for ‘soft energy’ policy paths, it remained 
difficult to illustrate how to achieve them using conventional forecasting 
techniques. This lead to the development and growth in energy backcasting 
analyses.  
 
Scenarios tend to be either ‘probable’ (i.e. most likely to happen in participants’ 
opinions), ‘possible’ (but not likely) or ‘preferable’ (most desirable or ethical) 
future when designing a backcasting approach. The first two are explorative and 
last is normative, respectively. Explorative scenarios show what could happen 
(and in this case what participants thought was likely to happen) and normative 
scenarios show how a solution to a particular problem should look, from the 
participants’ own personal point of view (Börjeson et al. 2006). The principle 
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underlying the backcasting approach in D5.3 is fundamentally normative rather 
than explorative – the future is desired and imagined and then the practical 
steps to implement that future are assessed (Cotton 2013, de Oliveira Musse et 
al. 2018). Backcasting is fundamentally normative in the sense that it is 
concerned with not only describing what the future looks like, but in providing an 
evaluation of that future.  
 
Bibri (2018) argues that the backcasting approach is well-suited for finding long-
term sustainability solutions due to its normative, goal-oriented, and problem-
solving character. Backcasting allows visionary images of futures at different 
temporal scales, and this can stimulate an accelerated movement towards 
achieving such normative goals. Such normative reasoning is indicative of a 
certain type of judgemental evaluation - whereby some actions or outcomes are 
classed as good, desirable, or permissible, and conversely others are bad, 
undesirable or impermissible. Therefore, the normative propositions presented 
within the backcasting workshops are fundamentally evaluative. Normativity 
should be understood in this context, as Parfit (1984) argues, as claims about 
the reasons for action. For example, we have reasons to believe something, to 
do something, to have specific desires, aims, attitudes and emotions. We are 
motivated to take certain actions, but how we justify one course of action or 
another is based upon personal evaluation of the quality of that action and its 
outcomes. Backcasting workshops are intended to stimulate this type of thinking 
amongst participants - the aim being to get them to evaluate the future and 
justify their reasons for doing so during ongoing facilitated deliberation. 
 
Backcasting methods 
 
The methods used during D5.3 represent a deliberative experiment (see for 
example Grönlund, Setälä, and Herne 2010) in backcasting methodology 
development. We designed the methodology to be consonant with the focus 
upon nuclear engagement history, and wanted to harness historical thinking in 
the imagination of nuclear engagement futures. The reasoning for this is that 
imagining the future is both practically difficult and cognitively taxing (Levin 
2004, Trope and Liberman 2010). Predicting long-term futures is difficult, in part 
because the quickening pace of societal and technological change over the last 
50 years has meant that the past is not always a reliable yardstick for predicting 
the future (Green et al. 2002). Individuals - though fully capable of thinking 
about the future - are influenced by the past, by remote locations, other people’s 
perspectives, and counterfactual alternatives in the imagination of such futures, 
and as such to imagine the future individuals must traverse psychological 
distance (Trope and Liberman 2010). Such psychological distance takes a 
reference point as the self in the here and now, and the distance might be the 
different ways in which an object might be removed from that point—in time, in 
space, in social distance, and in hypotheticality. Tope and Liberman (ibid.) 
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argue that imagining the future entails mental construal, and the farther 
removed an object is from direct experience, the higher (more abstract) the 
level of construal of that object. It is therefore necessary to try to anchor the 
imagination of the future by participants in concrete ways.  
 
As a methodological design point, we focus on three ways in which this might 
be achieved – firstly by anchoring understanding of the future in an assessment 
of the past, secondly by comparing what participants think is likely to occur in 
the future (exploratory scenarios) with what they believe to be desirable 
(normative scenarios), and thirdly by limiting the timeframe across which they 
imagine such futures – i.e. by focusing upon short-term timeframes of around 
two decades into the future (which is considered "reasonable" given these 
mental constraints Tonn, Hemrick, and Conrad 2006). 
 
The backcasting approach takes place in the context of deliberative research. 
Deliberative research brings together members of the public with key civil 
society stakeholders from industry, journalism, regulatory agencies, non-
governmental organisations, lobby groups and scientific institutions (Abelson et 
al. 2003, Burkhalter, Gastil, and Kelshaw 2002). A deliberative workshop is a 
mode of qualitative enquiry that is widely employed in northern Europe (Chilvers 
2010, Bohman 2000, Webler 1998). In essence, it is a facilitated conversation 
on a topic that may be familiar to some - but not all - participants. A deliberative 
workshop differs from a focus group in a number of ways. Focus groups present 
a series of questions followed by unstructured discussion amongst a small 
group of individuals. Such methods are useful for gaining feedback on 
proposals, gauging public attitudes, or reacting to specific propositions. 
However, focus groups tend to encourage participants to express top of the 
mind opinions and immediate reactions (Krueger 2000). Deliberation, by 
contrast, goes to a greater depth with strong interaction over time. In a 
deliberative workshop the emphasis is upon facilitated dialogue and 
argumentation structured around specific tasks, which encourage active 
listening and social learning (Steyaert et al. 2007, Blackmore, Ison, and Jiggins 
2007, Tippett et al. 2005).  
 
Participants are encouraged to listen and react to the propositions of other 
participants within a group, necessitating active facilitation by a trained facilitator 
(Clarke, Blackman, and Carter 2004, Frey 1995). Deliberation is based upon 
Habermas’s (1984) concept of ideal speech - whereby the rationality of 
arguments presented is a key criterion of success (see also Webler 1995). In 
the discussion of futures, facilitated dialogue aims to explore the differences 
between competing stakeholder interests but also common ground. The aim is 
not to create a single unified consensus, but rather to explore differences and 
identify any areas of natural consensus. In deliberative group activities 
facilitators must be mindful of social psychological effects that might limit the 
validity of the resulting qualitative data. These include groupthink (a bias 
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whereby outlying or contradictory positions are minimised or excluded), false 
consensus (where agreement masks social and philosophical divisions within 
the group), ‘social loafing’ (whereby individuals perform less work in a group 
than they would alone), ‘group polarization’ (decisions are made that are more 
extreme than the initial inclination of its members) and ‘escalation of 
commitment’ (where a group faces increasingly negative outcomes from an 
action but nevertheless continues the same behaviour rather than alter course) 
(Mannion and Thompson 2014). Managing these pitfalls is only possible with 
skilled facilitation. Moreover, the structuring of workshop methods and activities 
is paramount. To confirm the successful implementation of the workshops, an 
evaluation questionnaire was developed for completion by participants; the 
nature of the questionnaire, its rationale, and the results from this, are reported 
after the data analysis in Part 4. 
 
 
Sampling, reliability and validity 
 
The participatory process for data collection took the form of three deliberative 
workshops, held in Barcelona (September 2017), London (January 2018) and 
Munich (April 2018). The geographic focus differed in each case (Barcelona – 
nuclear power and civil society engagement in Southern Europe; London – 
northern Europe; Munich – Eastern Europe). Note that the focus of the 
discussions was participant-led, so country-specific perspectives were not 
predefined by the facilitators. Participants in the workshops were encouraged to 
bring in examples from their own experience and expertise regardless of the 
national case study context. In our workshops, we combined a strategic 
sampling approach combined with voluntary self-selection. We had a long list of 
nuclear industry stakeholders produced by the HoNESt partner organization 
SPI. We also used stakeholder networks from within the HoNESt program, and 
through searches of professional databases. Invitations were also sent out on 
social media, and citizen-stakeholders were invited to attend workshops in 
London and Munich through the use of Eventbrite – an event listing tool open to 
the public.  
 
Participants are kept anonymous, and utterances described in the analysis are 
unattributed (so-called Chatham House rules). However, a list of participating 
organisations in each workshop is included below: 
 
Barcelona 
 
• ZERO – Portugal 
• OECD – France 
• Universidad Pública de Navarra – Spain 
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• SNE – Spain 
• Kings College London 
• EDF 
 
London 
 
• National Nuclear Laboratories (four participants) – Scientific institutions – 
UK 
• 10 x Universities (Open, UCL, Sussex, Queen Mary, Imperial, Birkbeck, 
Cambridge, University of Highlands and Islands) 
• OECD 
• Energy for Humanity 
• Wood Plc. 
• European Commission 
• Innuserv 
• Euronuclear 
• Compelo 
• SckCen 
• So Ethical Media 
• 10 x unaffiliated citizen stakeholders 
 
Munich 
 
• Universities (TU Munich, KIT, Zeppelin University, Ecole Polytechnique 
Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL)) 
• JRC 
• Journalistin 
• European Commission 
• CEA 
• EON/ Deutsches Atomforum 
• Innuserv 
• TU Munich 
• KIT 
• BfS 
• Areva 
• Greencross 
• Department of Nuclear Energy Hungary 
• Deutsches Atomforum 
• Mothers Against Nuclear Power 
• Unaffiliated Citizen stakeholders (3 participants) 
 
We make no claims to demographic representation within the workshops. As 
with any other research within a post-positivist paradigm, the aim is to provide 
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an in-depth perspective upon the problem at hand using rich descriptive data, 
rather than aggregating top-of-the-mind perspectives in the manner of a 
quantitative social survey. In quantitative social science research, validity and 
representativeness are common evaluative tools for measuring the success of 
research outcomes. These are representative of a positivist social ontology, 
much like that of the natural sciences. Yet reliability and validity used in 
quantitative research should be redefined for their use in naturalistic settings 
such as those in the deliberative workshops, and Golafshani (2003) suggests 
that these can be reinterpreted as trustworthiness, rigour and quality within a 
qualitative paradigm. This means that the evaluation of the qualitative research 
is based on whether the analysis is representative of the discourse that 
emerges from group interaction, whether the theoretical insights emerging from 
the analysis are epistemologically grounded, and whether the recommendations 
made are suitably justified in light of the other two criteria.  
 
Conceptual framework and data analysis 
 
The data produced within the workshops combines a range of written, drawn 
and spoken elements. Collectively we can refer to this as qualitative data - in 
the sense that what is produced has no numerical value, but rather provides 
rich descriptive data about how individuals conceptualise and deliberate upon 
the issue of nuclear engagement futures across different national contexts.  
The conceptual framework through which the qualitative data is interpreted is 
that of symbolic interactionism. Symbolic interactionism is a social scientific 
theory concerned with how individuals utilize information, construct images and 
create symbolic worlds in order to communicate with one another. At its heart, 
symbolic interactionism suggests that people create shared meanings through 
their interactions, and those meanings become their reality (Charon and Cahill 
1979). As a conceptual framework, at the macro-scale this helps us to 
understand how society Is socially constructive through repeated interactions 
between individuals (Alver and Caglar 2015, Solomon 1983). At the micro-scale 
of these workshops, symbolic interaction helps us to understand the shared 
understanding and interpretation of meaning that emerged within the 
interactions between participants. According to the symbolic interactionist 
conceptual framework, meanings become modified through an interpretive 
process used by the person in dealing with phenomena that he or she 
encounters (Blumer 1986, Snow 2001). Analysis of interaction and behaviour is 
framed through the shared meaning attached to findings. In the workshops, we 
employed a range of dialogue, drawing and voting procedures (discussed below 
in the methodology section). Within the symbolic interactionist framework, the 
drawings, writing and discussions become windows into a “common set of 
symbols and understandings” (Patton 1990) which are shared amongst 
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workshop participants, and thus become “co-constructed” - their meaning is 
ascribed through interaction.   
 
In practice, all workshops were audio recorded, and all writings, drawings, and 
votes were recorded and photographed to form the primary data for analysis. 
Data analysis follows a constructivist paradigm, with thematic coding of 
workshop responses (Charmaz 2000, Boyatzis 1998, Braun and Clarke 2006). 
When coding transcripts of audio recorded data, thematic codes are commonly 
constructed in vivo “from the bottom-up” through reading and analysing specific 
utterances. However, in the workshops the discussions were framed and guided 
by the written and drawn material. The conversations were mapped out visually, 
and so a bottom-up approach is unnecessary. The drawn images were used as 
a guiding framework to structure the thematic analysis, in a manner similar to 
other qualitative analyses of deliberative workshop data (for example Chambers 
2002, Burgess et al. 2007, Cotton 2014, Partridge et al. 2017, Ipsos MORI 
Research Institute 2013). 
 
Due to the nature of the dialogue, how the workshops were structured, and the 
diversity of participant interests at stake, reporting of utterances within the 
workshops follows so called Chatham House rules. This means that utterances 
are contextualized by the workshop session and the task, though they are not 
attributed to specific individuals. This allows anonymization, encouraging free-
flowing dialogue. It also encourages shared group response to the problem 
task, reducing stakeholder conflict and minimizing reputational harm to 
participants. 
 
Workshop methods in practice 
 
In each case, the workshops were designed to identify 5 individual elements of 
nuclear engagement futures: 
 
1) To imagine and identify key characteristics of nuclear engagement 
histories for the respective geographic region 
2) To predict likely engagement futures 
3) To identify and delineate desirable engagement futures 
4) To analyse the steps required to achieve these futures 
5) To present potential policy/practice recommendations for achieving 
desirable futures. 
 
To operationalise this approach, we utilised 3 methods: 
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1) The River of Life methodology for examining nuclear engagement 
histories 
2) A backcasting method 
3) Dotmocracy™ for policy perspectives. 
 
In each case we give examples of the method and some initial indicative 
findings from the empirical data collected in the workshops themselves. 
 
Part 1. The River of Life 
 
The River of Life method is a visual narrative method used in participatory 
planning practice to help participants to discuss the past, present and future of a 
project, idea or process. The aim is to build a shared view compiled from 
differing stakeholder perspectives. Methodologically, the River of Life method is 
similar to the shared life histories method (Hope and S. 1994) used in 
participatory action research: it is a group facilitation technique that uses visual 
narratives to help people tell stories of the past, present and future. The method 
is set up as a facilitated dialogue session, i.e. a small group of participants 
discuss the proposal in a focus-group style setting. However, unlike a traditional 
focus group, the facilitator encourages the participants to imagine the project or 
proposal as river. Participants then articulate their perspectives on the proposal 
using visual metaphors pertaining to water. These could be the surrounding 
landscape, different types of water bodies (lakes, canals, tributaries, dams, 
waterfalls etc.), or systems/objects such as dams or boats. For example, a river 
could be drawn with channels “branching-out” if two different technologies were 
developed at a particular time, or if there was a change of government and a 
change of policy. Alternatively, tributaries could be used to join a main river to 
show where different ideas become popular and part of ‘the mainstream’. Other 
features like lakes created dead ends, such as when a policy failed or a 
technology was replaced by a more efficient design. 
 
The major events and milestones in the lives of (in this case) nuclear energy 
projects are placed into the narrative of the river to give it structure and to 
provide a chronology. Through group visualization the river becomes a tool to 
guide deliberation, allowing participants to capture the milestones, failures and 
successes of a project, idea or technology over time (Fisher and White 2018).  
 
In practical terms in the workshops we set up the River of Life on a large roll of 
paper (landscape oriented) mounted on a wall. Post-it notes and different 
coloured pens were used to make the river-shaped diagram that formed the 
focus of discussions. There was digital audio recording for each discussion. 
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The cohort of each workshop was broken up into groups of around 8 
participants (Barcelona - 2 groups, London – 3 groups, Munich - 2 groups), with 
each group guided by two facilitators. 
 
At each point, we asked participants to consider: 
- How are different people or groups of people involved in decisions about 
nuclear power? 
o Who is included and who is excluded, and why? 
- How are decisions made about nuclear power? 
o What decision-making processes are used, and why? 
- How have these things shaped the development of the nuclear industry 
over time? 
 
In the workshops two facilitators were ascribed to each group (one guiding the 
discussion the other taking notes, helping with recording and practical matters). 
One facilitator took primary control of the drawing process with suggestions and 
amendments along the way from participants such that the discussions were 
participant-led. The river mapped out the conversation that the participants took 
part in along the way, and participants had opportunities to challenge, change 
or agree the ways in which the river was shaped, the visual metaphor features 
deployed, and the milestones that were stuck on (using sticky notes). In the 
Munich workshops these were added at the start, but in the other sessions in 
London and Barcelona, they were added in along the way. Milestones included 
new policies, changes of direction, or key events that influenced the 
development of the nuclear industry. An example river from the Barcelona 
workshop is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 An Example River of Life 
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Part 2. Backcasting ideal nuclear engagement futures 
 
In this second session, participants aimed to project their idea of an ideal future 
for engagement with nuclear energy and society. This involves various 
components, firstly an understanding and articulation of their ideas of what an 
engagement future is, how likely and predicted futures differ from their ideal 
scenario, what features their ideal scenario has, and crucially, why is it ideal 
from their perspective? To break this down, we divided the backcasting session 
into two parts. First, participants are asked to imagine what is likely to happen, 
and then second what each participant wants to happen. 
 
We set a nominal end-point of 2050 for the projected backcasted futures, 
though discussions over nuclear waste management commonly extended 
beyond that period, and we placed no absolute limit on what future could be 
discussed.  
 
In the different workshops, we experimented with slight variations on the 
methods deployed. In Barcelona, we used the River of Life and extended it into 
the future through group discussion, which was then annotated with post-it 
notes on ideal futures and then these were grouped together. However, in 
London and Munich we switched this slightly based upon feedback from the first 
Barcelona workshop, and gave each participant a few post-it notes, asking them 
to individually and privately write down what their ideal nuclear engagement 
future looks like. This latter method proved very effective. At all times, we asked 
them to consider in the construction of the futures: 
 
- How are different people or groups of people involved in decisions about 
nuclear power 
o Who is included and who is excluded, and why? 
- How are decisions made about nuclear power? 
o What decision-making processes are used, and why? 
- How will these things shape the development of the nuclear industry in 
the future? 
 
The facilitator then groups the notes together into a collective set where ideas 
presented are similar or related. 
 
These are then grouped and labelled as the ideal futures and put up on 
individual sheets at the far end (on the right) of a long sheet. 
 
As mentioned above, backcasting is a process of taking the imagined futures 
that are desirable and working backwards (in this case from right to left across a 
broad sheet of paper) starting with the ideal future and then moving backwards 
towards the present. Of the ideal features presented participants could choose 
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to discuss any of them (this was facilitator guided). Using a model similar to that 
described by Mitchell and White (2003), we asked participants to consider three 
elements: 
 
• Actions – e.g. new policies, new designs or technologies, ideas, 
protests, anything that people can do to make the ideal future happen. 
• Actors - i.e. individuals (inventors, politicians, representatives of non-
governmental or civil society organisations), or organisations with a 
specific purpose, like government departments, companies or charities.  
• Assumptions – these are the contextual factors that influence what 
actors can and can’t do, and how they do it. For example, these could be 
assumptions about the state of the economy, about the availability of 
certain resources, the political climate in which decisions are taken, etc. 
 
The links between these three elements were presented to the participants in a 
linear fashion (as shown below in Figure X), but the facilitators were clear that 
their output would likely be messier than this. The aim was to put together these 
different elements in a way that helped participants to think about the problem 
over time rather than trying to make a neat-looking diagram.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By discussing the interrelated elements of actors, actions and assumptions, the 
participants construct a concept diagram that moved chronologically backwards 
from future to present. When the present is reached for each of the ideal futures 
identified then the process is concluded. 
 
Part 3. Action planning and reflection 
 
Present point ß Assumption ß Actor ß Action ß AssumptionßIdeal future 
\     / 
Assumption ß Actor ß Actionß AssumptionßAction 
\    / 
Action ß Actionß AssumptionßAction 
 
Figure 2 Diagrammatic representation of backcasting 
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The final task was a small group-facilitated discussion using an approach to 
start action planning for implementing the backcasted visions of ideal nuclear 
engagement futures. The participants were instructed to discuss in small groups 
what actions the identified actors in the backcasting method should take to 
make specific ideal futures happen, based upon the actions and assumptions 
listed for each and to rate one another’s ideas using a specific format. The 
process was finalised by distilling the actions, actors and assumptions from the 
previous session into an action plan – a strategy that should be put into place to 
start the process of achieving the desired end state. 
 
Participants were instructed to look at the actions, actors and assumptions 
closest to the present. We then asked them to question “How can we start and 
then sustain a process that leads to your ideal future?” 
 
The last session used a method commonly referred to as Dotmocracy (TM) or 
Idea rating sheets, shown in Figure _. Dotmocracy is a facilitation method used 
to describe voting with dot stickers or marks with a marker pen (sometimes 
called dot-voting). In dot-voting participants voted on their chosen options using 
a limited number marks with pens to create a form of cumulative voting 
(Diceman 2014).  
In practice, a series of sheets were put on tables. Individuals were instructed to 
write potential plans, strategies or actions that could be taken by different 
stakeholders. These were then put around the room and participants was 
instructed to ‘vote’ on them by marking approval or disapproval of the idea on 
the sheet – thus giving us some indication of the desirability of these actions. 
The signatures on the side were optional, but they allow us to know ‘who thinks 
what’ – i.e. what preferences different stakeholders within the workshops had. 
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Figure 3 A Dotmocracy™ sheet 
 
The Dotmocracy™ method has a number of advantages. It’s less cognitively 
demanding than having to perform a full ranking of all the options, because 
participants are not required to give a comparative judgment of each option, and 
it allows participants to express a preference for more than one option at the 
same time. It also leverages the collective wisdom of the team, and provides an 
equal way for all the voices on the team to be heard and have accountability in 
prioritizing key issues, and finally it creates a sense of engagement and allows 
participants to see the decision process in action and understand how the final 
choice was made (Diceman 2014). This has specific value in ‘closing down’ the 
sessions on futures as it provides a set of clear actions, future directions for 
research and policy, and some basic evaluation of their popularity amongst 
participants.  
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Results 
 
Results are discussed through thematic analysis of symbolic representations 
emergent within group discussions (Boyatzis 1998, Braun and Clarke 2006). 
The aim in this section is to identify commonalities of thinking and social 
imagining of the histories and futures of nuclear energy and society and to 
discuss potential differences amongst them (with a particular emphasis on 
country-specific differences that contextualize the findings within the pan-
European project). The analysis is therefore structured into three sections, and 
each is subdivided to compare between the three workshops, as well as 
between individual stakeholder groups within each workshop: 
 
1. Imagined histories 
2. Backcasted futures 
3. Planning and policy making for nuclear engagement futures 
 
 
Part 1 – The River of Life findings  
Background 
The River of Life method is designed to draw upon the memories of individuals, 
and then weave them together into a coherent narrative about how nuclear 
engagement histories unfolded. It must be noted that this focus upon the social 
scientific study of participant imagining of the past is grounded in an 
understanding of memory. Memory is an integral part of the mental functioning 
of individuals and is closely linked to cognitive processes of personality 
construction and selfhood (Singer and Salovey 2010, Yang 2013). But individual 
or personal memory is also a part of the cognitive processes that allows human 
beings to function in social settings. As Cubitt (2013) argues, its forms are 
influenced by its social uses, and it makes a contribution to social knowledge 
and social understanding that can be explored from a group as well as an 
individual angle. Memory is therefore a resource both for individuals within 
society and for societies themselves and how it is connected to larger social 
processes. The term memory is used here in the sense that the information 
gleaned within the workshops is located first within the minds of individuals, and 
then constructed (collectively) through a process of facilitated dialogue, and 
interpreted by individuals in such a way that they can draw meaning from what 
is said, shape the dialogue that surrounds discussion of the historical facts and 
proffer their own interpretation. The emphasis in the analysis is upon memory 
and its relationship to framing (Barthe 2009, Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 
Frisch 1993, Clarke et al. 2015, Kahneman and Tversky 1984) – how specific 
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attributes, events, and interpretations are emphasized over others. There is no 
single version of events to which all participants in the workshops will ascribe; 
rather, different stakeholder actors emphasise different elements in order to 
construct their own narrative about what is important, which events are 
discussed, and how they should be interpreted (in a normative sense).  
 
We conduct the analysis of framing as a matter of symbolic interaction rather 
than historical analysis per se. We are interested in how individuals draw upon 
and then socially construct knowledge of things that fall within their personal 
and professional experience – the biases and heuristics that they employ in 
their interpretations are not judged or corrected. Our analysis is distinct from 
history as an academic discipline employed in Work package 2. Historical 
analysis draws upon multiple lines of evidence through which to deduce 
knowledge of past circumstances (Carr 2018, Lemon 2002).  
 
Our social scientific analysis uses the workshop products as representations of 
social memory – we examine how individual representations of nuclear energy 
and society are morphed into understandings and senses of the past which are 
then reproduced through group dialogue, story-telling, metaphors, and visual 
representations. The aim within the River of Life sessions is not to challenge the 
accuracy of these social memories in comparison with the historical record. 
Rather, the aim is to explore through symbolic interactionist analysis how 
broader ideas of technological development over time are perceived, imagined 
and socially constructed in dialogue and through drawn images (including visual 
metaphors). It is important to note, therefore, that what is important is what is 
emphasised and imagined by participants, not what is right or contestable, 
when discussing nuclear engagement histories. In short, it doesn’t matter if the 
facts contained within a line of argument are wrong, what matters is that the 
participants choose to emphasise such lines of argument over others. 
 
The analysis draws upon the very broad geographical spread covered within the 
workshops. Discussions amongst participants encompass multiple national 
histories, political structures, financial and resource geographies, technology 
development programmes and innovations, and numerous political actors. As 
such, the information discussed in the workshops is subject to interpretive 
flexibility (Pinch and Bijker 1984, Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987) different 
actors will employ different values and ‘frames’ (Kahneman and Tversky 1984) 
in their understanding and discussion. This can be summarised as one 
participant stated:  
 
“The details are very complex; the primary source material is often secret 
and often subject to interpretation.” (London, Group 2). 
 
The aim is not to describe the perceptions of each of the complex national 
histories here, but rather to describe and assess emergent commonalities in the 
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way in which nuclear engagement is framed. We aim to assess through 
qualitative analysis of the written and spoken data to show how the exchange of 
meaning in the workshops through language and symbols (Blumer 1986) helps 
the participants to make sense of the nuclear engagement phenomenon. We 
present these dominant frames and by grouping them under a series of 
thematic subheadings. 
 
Structure and agency, stability and change 
 
Within the social sciences is a core meta-theoretical question about the role of 
structure and agency and shaping social conditions and the actions of free-
willed agents, and how this related to the issue of stability and change in 
dynamic social processes. Structure is defined as a set of constraining 
conditions: in this context we can understand these as including (but not limited 
to) material resource constraints. These include issues such as the availability 
of fossil fuels, the presence of coastal locations for some reactor types (as is 
the case of any thermal power station that requires abundant coolant water), or 
the broader political or ideological conditions that shape certain innovation and 
technology development actions and not others. Social structure is not simply 
about physical resources but also cultural resources including political 
ideologies, norms and social rules. Agency, by contrast, describes the actions 
of free-willed individuals to meet their own needs and have influence upon the 
world around them. In this context, we might understand agency as the capacity 
of innovators, politicians, or civil society organisations such as protests groups, 
to influence these structural conditions. In work package 4 of HoNESt these 
groups are defined as stakeholders (under categories including regulators, 
promoters, and so on), and this terminology is useful in simplifying what is 
meant by agents in this context. The key point to emphasise is that we can 
understand structure and agency as having a dialectical relationship – in the 
sense that certain constraints enable particular actions and discourage others, 
but where constraints are undesirable, agents strategise, learn from past 
actions and work collectively to overcome them. The application of agency then 
changes the social landscape in which action can be taken, and thus creates a 
new set of social constraints (it reforms social structure). In the context of 
nuclear energy and society, we can understand this dialectical relationship as 
an iterative and cyclical process of socio-technical system development over 
time (Sewell Jr 1992, Archer 2003, Giddens 1986, Hay 1995, Cotton 2015, 
Jessop 2005) – certain decisions and actions open up new options and close 
down others, and discussing these facets is the core purpose of the analysis.  
 
If we take structure-agency as a starting point, this in turn, relates to 
stability/continuity (the features of the social world that remain constant) and 
change (those that alter either incrementally over longer periods or radically 
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within a shorter time frame) (Meijerink 2005, Streeck and Thelen 2005, 
Pettigrew 2013). The concept of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ is familiar to the social 
sciences when discussing processes of change, as it defines a dialectical 
relationship between structure and agency, and between stability and change 
over time.  
 
There are different models of change commonly presented in the social 
sciences, though these tend to fall into three categories: incremental, 
revolutionary or punctuated equlibrium. Incremental changes are represented 
by a series of small steps. Change occurs only as a result of bargaining 
between partisan interests, and so bigger “heroic” changes are rare. In the 
incremental model, policy-making processes occur as a matter of trial and error, 
and because partisan political parties are ever fluctuating and power shifting 
between different interests, genuine paradigmatic shifts within the policy 
landscape are suppressed (Cotton 2017, Hayes 2006). In the revolutionary 
model, there is an emphasis upon “ critical junctures” - such as for example 
times of crisis: during these periods there is a rapid social change within a very 
short timeframe (Suddaby, Foster, and Mills 2014). The revolutionary model 
suggests that during crises, policy innovators will capture the narrative and push 
through rapid changes in the policy landscape. The third model is the 
punctuated equilibrium model which is more or less a hybrid of the other two 
(Gersick 1991). In punctuated equilibrium, long periods of incremental change 
are broken up by shorter periods of accelerated change at key points. 
Punctuated equilibrium is a popular explanation of social change amongst 
political scientists, due to its flexibility in describing a dialectical relationship 
between stability and change over time. We return to this concept in the 
analysis of the data.  
 
Implicit within any discussion of history within the workshops are these two 
dialectical meta-theoretical features – the role of agents and institutions in 
constraining or enabling particular actions, and how this results in periods of 
slow or rapid change in the nuclear policy landscape of the respective countries. 
What is notable in the context of the River of Life method, is that these 
dialectical relationships are implicitly drawn and discussed – the visual 
metaphors of water courses (rivers, streams, lakes etc.) become representative 
of stability and change within socio-technical systems, and the annotations to 
these water courses and the milestones they were asked to place on the 
drawings (including other visual metaphors, cartoons, slogans, logos, stick 
figures etc.) show how agents and technologies interact within these processes 
of change. In terms of how the concepts of nuclear energy and society are 
symbolically represented in the workshop discussion, these relationships 
between actors and institutions, change and continuity are very clearly (if 
implicitly) expressed.  
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When completing the analysis of the qualitative spoken and drawn data from 
this session of the three workshops, the first point to note is that there is a huge 
range of structure-agency relationships that emerge. Participants continually 
frame and reframe periods of stability and change within the nuclear-energy-
and-society landscape across the different countries, trans-border regions and 
timeframes. Examples of these are discussed to illustrate the complexity and 
diversity of these relationships, though this cannot be fully comprehensive in 
terms of the level of detail for individual countries at specific periods of time; 
rather the broader thematic representations are of interest in this analysis 
because they serve to ground the later understanding of nuclear engagement 
futures expressed in subsequent sessions.  
 
Findings 
Structure and agency under different governance regimes 
 
There are a number of key emergent structure-agency dialectical relationships 
as they relate to the question of nuclear energy and civil society engagement 
processes. The first concerns the role of political regimes in furthering energy 
policy goals that are either pro- or anti-nuclear at different periods in history. 
This is discussed primarily in terms of the differences between the democratic 
regimes of Western and northern Europe, and the United States, in comparison 
to the former socialist republics of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
the former fascist states of Spain and Portugal. Primarily these are referred to in 
terms of democratic and authoritarian political regimes respectively. The 
second, involves the role of scientists, specific innovators and other key 
stakeholders to augment the structural constraints of particular political regimes, 
to engage with policy networks for nuclear energy, and directly with civil society 
organisations and affected publics. The third, involves the power of scientific 
and governmental advisory bodies, the knowledge produced by them and the 
resultant reporting of such knowledge as creating a punctuated equilibrium of 
nuclear energy policy development (this term is explained below). The fourth, 
concerns how engagement practices have been stimulated by the actions of 
social movements of opposition in response to the actions of government 
authorities.  
 
The ‘top-level’ observation to the development of early nuclear energy 
programmes is that participants describe the development of nuclear 
technologies under the formally communist regimes of the Soviet Union, 
Warsaw Pact and Comecon countries (notably Bulgaria and East Germany and, 
to a lesser extent, Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania), 
and the formerly fascist political systems of Spain and Portugal in the mid-20th 
century, in very specific ways. One key finding that relates to the understanding 
of engagement in the context of authoritarian regimes is, in broad brush terms, 
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that participants view the development of such nuclear programmes in terms of 
individuals (often scientists) trying to navigate and augment a complex, resistant 
and indifferent political regime. Such regimes are driven by broader ideological 
concerns about national image, resource constraints in globalising fossil fuel 
markets, and soft power accumulation within a bi-polar global governance 
regime between East and West. In the democratic nations, specifically the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, Sweden, France (and latterly a reunified Germany), 
participants tended to define the actions of the state primarily in agential terms 
through the actions of innovators, pioneers, trusted experts, and military secret-
keepers. Military and independent scientific and technical advisory bodies were 
argued to be the key players in shaping nuclear policy programmes through 
either secretive or technocratic means. These became progressively less 
‘secret’ as policy making gave way to newer forms of participatory engagement 
and democratic renewal. Like the authoritarian regimes, democratic countries 
had similar pressures around resource scarcity and rapidly increasing fossil fuel 
prices (particularly in the context of the oil crisis of 1972-73), but approached 
nuclear technology development in slightly different terms - primarily around the 
soft power gained by scientific innovation, technology transfer and the 
marketization of nuclear expertise. This contrast between these two types of 
political regime is one of the key engagement contexts that emerged in the 
workshops. 
 
Authoritarian and democratic influences upon nuclear energy 
engagements 
 
In the workshops, there were representatives that spoke about former Soviet 
republics/members of Comecon and the Warsaw Pact within the sphere of 
Soviet influence (Czech Republic, Hungary and the former East Germany and 
the former People’s Republic of Bulgaria). Understanding the role of nuclear 
energy within the USSR and its allies has political-structural, resource, and 
ideological components that are outlined below.  
 
In general, we can categorise the socially constructed history of the USSR and 
other socialist republics presented in the workshops as an approach to nuclear 
technology development grounded in a range of underlying motivations and 
rationales. The first is experimentation with different types of energy 
technologies (lignite was mentioned for example) to combat power cuts and 
potential coal shortages across the Union. The USSR/Comecon was also 
perceived as concerned with building reactors that involved large-scale 
collective labour efforts – nuclear energy was argued to be desirable to the 
USSR/Comecon precisely because it involved mega-project construction which 
was highly technical and labour-intensive. This allowed socialist republic 
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officials to showcase the power of collective labour by building reactors so 
quickly (within 5 years). There were also broader resource constraints 
particularly around energy, access to energy markets, fuel transportation across 
the Soviet republics, electricity shortages, and concerns around the 
technological efficiency of broader industrial programmes that were discussed 
in detail, and these material constraints were powerful in shaping nuclear 
energy decisions.  
 
In Bulgaria, for example, by the mid-1960s one participant discussed the role of 
power cuts in shaping nuclear energy technology choice. Specifically, this 
relates to the material conditions by which energy security concerns created 
political will for the development of nuclear power, though there were detractors 
within government that created opposition grounded upon the perception that 
“the technology was too young” (Barcelona group 2), and it is only after a period 
of political obduracy around nuclear decision-making (where little technology 
policy change occurred) did a nuclear programme emerge compared to other 
fossil fuel development programmes at the time. It was also noted that the push 
for nuclear energy was in part driven by a lack of efficiency in industrial sectors. 
There were very clear resource needs to fuel the industrial expansion of the 
socialist republics, and these were discussed heavily in the Barcelona and 
Munich workshops. Although there was an easing of fuel shortages over time, 
the inefficiency of some sectors like steel production (for example), drove rapid 
development to improve industrial capacity and energy efficiency within the 
socialist economic system (Barcelona Group 2). Yet in other cases (notably 
East Germany) in the immediate post Second World War era developments in 
coal extraction meant that immediate economic shortages were less of a 
concern compared to long-term planning for resource scarcity (what could be 
termed ‘peak coal’). As one participant in the Munich workshop put it: 
 
“There was a lot of coal in the 1950s and 60s, so it was a prognosis for 
the future, that these resources would run out.” (Munich group 2).  
  
Resource scarcity was a common structural theme that framed discussion of all 
nuclear histories. The development of nuclear energy in the 1950s had a 
common thread across both the authoritarian and democratic nations 
discussed. A lot of this has to do with post-war reconstruction, the constraints 
placed by coal production, and the rapid period of economic growth that 
emerged in both capitalist and communist countries. In relation to countries 
such as Germany, there was discussion about: 
 
“The German economic wonder – the need for cheap energy and the 
trust in society for the technology was the main reasons for the stepping 
in for the use of nuclear power in the economy. There was a huge need 
for energy and this was one of the possibilities to get a bigger amount 
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compared to the other sources of energy, and it was cheaper in the long-
term perspective.” (Munich group 2) 
 
In short, the long-term economics of nuclear energy in the 1960s, and then the 
threats created by the Oil Crisis in the early 1970s were perceived as key 
motivating factors behind the expansion of nuclear during this period. It was 
clear from the workshop discussions that nuclear energy – from a historical 
perspective - can only be understood in relation to fossil fuel resource 
economics both in democratic and authoritarian regimes. Decisions were often 
made under conditions of long-term certainty over both resource availability in 
the short-term (due to price shocks from the oil crisis), and broader projections 
of resource scarcity from peak oil and peak coal.  
 
The emphasis upon rapid industrial expansion is posited against a backdrop of 
growing international concern with sustainable development, with environmental 
justice, and the rise of green politics. The Barcelona and London workshops 
mentioned the club of Rome report: The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 
1972), and the growing ecological movement that influenced green politics in 
Sweden, and later Germany. Green politics was not simply about representation 
of green parties in European parliaments (it was noted that in the UK for 
example, first past the post political systems precluded the rise of green politics 
in government), but also the development of new dedicated environment 
departments and explicit commitments to sustainable development within the 
national governments of the UK, Germany, France, and Sweden. These twin 
factors of highly volatile fossil fuel prices and new policy structures to manage 
long-term resource scarcity were perceived as instrumental in furthering the 
nuclear policy agendas of many different countries under consideration in these 
workshops. 
 
In terms of engagement practice, there are a number of other political, 
sociological and ideational motivations (other than concerns over resource 
scarcity and price volatility) that lay behind different nuclear programmes. One 
common theme that was discussed, is the political desirability of atomic energy 
technology at the beginning of the Cold War period. What was remarked upon 
was, what we could term, the soft power afforded by becoming an atomic-
energy wielding nation. For countries such as United Kingdom or the United 
States, the development of nuclear weapons and concurrent civilian nuclear 
energy programmes was described in a number of ways, for example: 
 
“[The UK] Keeping a seat at the top table” (London group 2). 
 
“The Atom is great, it makes us (the USA) a superpower” (London group 
1).  
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This represents both hard and soft power in global politics. Having access to 
nuclear technologies gives the hard-military power of strategic and tactical 
nuclear weapons, but access to civilian nuclear energy also provides 
considerable soft power. The former is the ability of governments to influence 
global affairs by exercising military capabilities (a show of force), or economic 
capabilities (such as sanctions, trade deals etc.) to support their agenda. The 
latter is the capacity to influence decision-making both domestically and globally 
through diplomatic channels, through culture, language, and crucially for this 
context, through scientific advancement and technological transfer (Nye 1990, 
Nye Jr 2009). These last two are sometimes more accurately termed ‘smart 
power’ (Wilson III 2008). The role of domestic scientific and technological 
expertise, the development of reactor designs and, certainly in democratic 
nations, the capacity to trade those designs internationally, were perceived as a 
powerful draw for governments to invest in domestic nuclear industry 
capabilities in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. As technological programmes moved 
away from post-war reconstruction towards international competition, this in turn 
was driven by the prevailing technological optimism of this period. As one 
Munich workshop participant states: 
 
“It was economic development after the Second World War, this is similar 
in France and Great Britain, it was a future dominated by technology, the 
car became more accessible, people believed that they would have flying 
cars by the 1990s. It was a particular way of thinking.” (Munich group 2).  
 
The public zeitgeist was defined as a desire for a high-tech “space-age” lifestyle 
and government support to innovators to achieve this. This is conceptually a 
form of technological optimism (Basiago 1994, Salmon 1977) or meliorism – a 
sense that technological progress will reap social welfare benefits in a 
progressive and linear fashion.  
 
There was, in the context of authoritarian regimes, a perceived desire not just 
for technological advancement, but for social solidarity building across national 
borders (in the case of the former Soviet republics to cement their position 
within the USSR, and to showcase domestically the power of collective labour): 
 
“They took the decisions – they made it ideological because there were 
10,000 people building in 1964. The first reactor was put by Soviet 
operators, and the second was Bulgarian” (Barcelona group 2).  
 
The idea presented was that by showcasing 10,000 workers in collective labour 
effort, that this would prove the efficiency of communist labour practices. 
Nuclear energy also had the capacity to improve the relative status of specific 
Soviet republics in relation to others in the eyes of the USSR Central 
authorities. For instance, in relation to the Czech Republic, one participant in 
the Munich workshop noted: 
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“There was demand for nuclear due to a political influence, a hunger for 
the new knowledge, for the new power. It was a very political decision. 
(Munich group 2)  
 
From the Atoms For Peace rhetoric onwards, civilian nuclear power, and 
notably the quest for fusion power, are very clear examples of socio-technical 
imaginaries (Jasanoff and Kim 2009) constructed around technological 
optimism - dominant collective social identities at the highest levels of 
government, through which technological development, progress, and 
knowledge about nuclear become powerful drivers of policy. At the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the rhetoric of atoms for peace was perceived to re-emerge - 
the peaceful applications of nuclear energy were a sign of both international 
standing and of technological modernisation. For Germany, for example, this 
was described as: 
 
“[For Germany] Atoms for Peace was “welcome back to the family”, 
nuclear power meant acceptance.” (Munich group 2) 
 
Nuclear energy is thus presented in terms of globalism – engagement across 
previously isolated Cold War powers. Trust to trade with the reunified Germany, 
and to encourage regionally connected nuclear energy, was thus seen as an 
international test of this globalist engagement. It is notable that the 
sociotechnical imaginary of nuclear is to broad extent perceived as more 
important than the more mundane economic forecasting of energy prices in 
shaping decisions. Indeed, it is clear from the workshop discussions that’s the 
way in which nuclear energy is imagined by key policy actors is very powerful in 
changing the energy landscapes of the respective countries. What is clear 
however is that different countries have very different political attitudes towards 
involving civil society actors - including members of the public - in shaping the 
sociotechnical imaginary of nuclear-power. And this in turn is partly dependent 
on the Democratic status of the nation in question. 
 
A role for public engagement 
 
At the heart of the HoNESt project is concern with civil society engagement with 
nuclear energy. This type of engagement has many facets and forms. In 
authoritarian regimes, such as those of the USSR, participants commonly talked 
about governments acting unilaterally (in some cases this was perceived to be 
without civil society consent) to develop the technology. Scientists and 
engineers became allied to these nuclear projects, and ultimately had very little 
sway over their development, siting, or construction. Under authoritarian 
regimes the socio-political structural conditions are perceived as fixed and 
immutable – politics is almost universally defined in terms of institutional 
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constraints (in essence as a "closed society", see Popper 2012), and there was 
very limited direct agency of citizens and other stakeholders to affect change, 
until those regimes fell (with the fall of the USSR, or the death or removal of 
fascist leaders in Spain and Portugal respectively). When asked directly by the 
facilitator in one of the Barcelona groups about a role for public actors under 
authoritarian regimes, the response was that even though there were 
opportunities for public meetings and other forms of group decision-making 
activity, in the context of the USSR and Warsaw pact countries (and specifically 
in Bulgaria): 
 
Speaker 1: 
 
“It is communism, if you have money you can buy these things [reactor 
technologies]. We have news, but they are fake, they are not informed. 
You have public meetings, but real public expression is not that. In 
communism, it is a puppet society, there is a show and a real discussion 
happening elsewhere.” 
 
Speaker 2: 
 
“In Russian history, they call it kitchen conversation” (both from 
Barcelona group 2). 
 
A common feature in the construction of the milestones across the River of Life 
were individuals who were identified because they circumvented or augmented 
the power of authoritarian regimes in the Soviet Union, or under fascist control, 
by appealing to other authorities (the church, foreign powers, scientific 
institutions), or by defecting and then engaging in technology transfer activities 
from a position of safety in the West. The agency of individuals to shape the 
social structural/institutional landscape of authoritarian regimes appeared to 
only occur when agents (notably scientists) could co-opt the power of other 
external authorities to counter the power of domestic fascist or communist 
governments. When it comes to the discussion of the actions of individual 
scientists in authoritarian regimes, there are a few noteworthy examples. For 
instance, discussion of early nuclear development in Bulgaria was framed in 
terms of a “Mother and Father of nuclear technology” (Barcelona Group 1). 
Elisabeth Ivanova Kara-Michailova (the referenced mother of nuclear power) 
was a nuclear physicist and pioneer of women in science, but her involvement 
was framed in terms of an individual whose career struggled because she was 
anti-communist. In the Barcelon group 2, there was much discussion of Fermi, 
and in the London workshop or Oppenheimer and Einstein. What is notable is 
that when it comes to the description of different scientists, this is primarily in 
terms of their competencies, their political stance, and the relationship to the 
prevailing political or ideological conditions in which they operated. This is an 
important finding in terms of engagement – that the power to create structural 
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change is, in authoritarian regimes, perceived as an external rather than internal 
process. Individual citizens are commonly construed as powerless to enact 
change. Thus although public meetings and other forms of communicative 
exercises led by communist authorities were mentioned, these were generally 
agreed to be a form of placation rather than engagement in any meaningful 
sense (see for example Arnstein 1969), in a manner described in D4.3 of the 
HoNESt project (Espluga et al. 2018).  
 
When looking at comparator democratic regime responses to scientific and 
technical engagement, unsurprisingly, in the context of American and West 
European nuclear development, many of the key agents mentioned in early 
nuclear energy programmes were scientists and engineers of the Manhattan 
Project. These actors featured heavily in structuring understanding of and 
engagement with the science of nuclear energy in the late 1930s and 1940s. In 
the River of Life sessions this period was commonly represented a bomb with a 
radiation symbol, or the iconic mushroom cloud. During this period, it was the 
actions of scientists from the Manhattan project itself (Oppenheimer and Bethe 
featured heavily and Einstein, Fermi and Feynman were all mentioned).  
 
Though discussions in relation to the authoritarian regimes primarily prefaced 
with discussion of the bravery and tenacity of scientific actors in the face of strict 
ideological political constraints, there is a corollary to that in the west. For 
example, one participant in the London workshops made reference to the 
French nuclear programme and highlighted how scientists (notably Fuchs) 
came to Chalk River for research purposes, but were arrested and detained 
and: 
 
“…given the label spies. The whole situation would be different because 
two key actors had different political views from the perspective of 
America, and it would have been very different if they had been Christian 
democrats, for example.” (London group 2).  
 
Under the Cold War conditions, military nuclear secrets and anti-communist 
political ideology are perceived to close down (Stirling 2004) engagement on 
nuclear policy in the West. But there is an interesting similarity between the 
actions towards anti-communist sentiment within the Soviet republics and pro-
communist sentiment within the United States. Both can be understood as the 
constraining structural conditions under which nuclear science operated. Given 
the importance to individual actors that the participants highlighted, it seems 
that there is a common frame through which participants presented their 
respective nuclear “stories”. We could call this trope - a storytelling device, 
namely the heroic struggle of an individual in the face of adverse external 
forces. This idea of the heroic scientist has considerable impact upon the 
perceptions of engagement processes that surrounded nuclear energy 
development across the USA/Western European and Eastern European 
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powers. It is clear that the actions of individual scientists, rather than external 
stakeholder groups or heterogeneous publics were perceived to have had the 
greatest influence upon policy development both within Western democratic 
nations and amongst the authoritarian regimes of fascist Spain, Portugal and 
the communist countries of the USSR at the birth of the nuclear industry. 
 
 
Democratic political regimes and engagement with science and 
technology 
 
Though in many of the authoritarian political regimes science was presented 
heroically – as individual scientists striving to overcome the constraints of an 
oppressive political environment, in the context of the democratic nations 
(specifically UK, France, Belgium and Sweden) scientific engagement with 
nuclear energy and society was portrayed in more ways than this. The role of 
scientists was framed less in terms of the actions of individuals to overcome 
systemic constraints, but rather in terms of the collective action of scientific, 
independent, quasi-autonomous non-governmental, or governmental advisory 
bodies, to affect change through collective action and active involvement in 
policy networks. The mechanism through which these agents had control over 
the social structural settings of nuclear energy was perceived to be primarily 
through scientific reporting and independent advice, and this is discussed in 
detail below.  
 
Unsurprisingly, given the origins of the first civilian nuclear programmes in both 
uranium enrichment and plutonium production (in the UK for example this was 
explicitly discussed as a core aspect of the weapons programme), The 
Manhattan Project, and its later counterparts in Europe, played a strong role in 
shaping the participants’ understanding of ‘where nuclear energy came from’ 
(so to speak). It is notable that the Manhattan project, despite its devastating 
consequences in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was mostly portrayed with either 
positive or neutral sentiment by participants. As one London participant put it: 
 
“The context of the war was very important. Oppenheimer was trying to 
defeat the Nazis, he was in a battle of good against evil. And to do this 
terrible thing to prevent this catastrophic thing to prevent a terrible 
outcome, the loss of The Allies. The shift from, the scientific to the 
political is very important.” (London Group 1).  
 
Oppenheimer and Einstein were mentioned as important figures framed in the 
heroic scientist trope - having gone from developing nuclear weapons to 
recanting and then campaigning against nuclear weapon proliferation. The 
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relationship between military and civilian uses of nuclear technology following 
on from Manhattan Project was primarily framed in terms of funding, technology 
transfer, and regulatory governance. There was considerable discussion around 
how the Manhattan Project “turned on the funding tap” (Barcelona group 1) for 
nuclear projects across the west. In the Barcelona workshop group 1, this was 
drawn as a giant bucket pouring money into the river. Though there was general 
agreement that nuclear weapons “came first” in terms of technology 
development programs in the west, not all agreed. One participant in London 
group 1 workshop wanted to reframe the portrayal of the history of radiation 
science and the promise that those discoveries held: 
 
“Can I go back even further to 1890 to when they discovered radiation, 
Marie Curie. I wouldn’t like the beginning to be linked necessarily to 
weapons production” (London Group 1).  
 
It is important to note that there was considerable debate about where to start 
the narrative of nuclear energy, particularly in the London workshops. When 
discussing Western engagement with nuclear-power, the early scientific 
discoveries from physicists such as Marie Curie were perceived to have had 
significant repercussions for engagement practices throughout the 20th century. 
Workshop participants in London, and in Munich, highlighted how radiation was 
first seen as something positive for health and to future technological 
development. For example, the radium springs were mentioned – that 
radioactive waters were treated “as an elixir” (London Group 1) in the early days 
of radiation science. Thus, early public reactions in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries were initially positive – participants noted that there was an almost 
alchemical approach to understanding radiation – it was presented as a solution 
to many problems, and promoted as a quack cure for a range of different 
ailments. As an engagement issue, this set of positive associations that 
emerged in response to early radiation science communication had a powerful 
and long-lasting effect. As one participant put it: 
 
“The early promise and the awe that radiation created also led to the flip 
side – the fear that happened later. So, with great power comes great 
responsibility” (London Group 1).  
 
The very earliest engagement processes in the nuclear field were perceived to 
be around radiation safety. The first public communication activities were 
construed as those trying to dispel the myths that consuming large quantities of 
radioactive elements would be good for health (for discussion of this point see 
Macklis 1999). Of greater significance was the practice of science 
communication around radiation protection that emerged after the Japanese 
bombings and nuclear weapon testing programmes in the 1950s and 60s. As 
one participant noted: 
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“Marie Curies’ cancer led to radiation protection, and Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, the American army were interested in finding out if soldiers 
could enter irradiated environments” (London Group 1).  
 
Engagement with nuclear in the immediate post-War period, was primarily 
discussed in terms of radiation protection science. One participant noted that 
radiation protection was initially of interest to military authorities trying to protect 
soldiers, and to model the consequences of strategic nuclear weapon use and 
how this would potentially interact with military personnel under different Cold 
War scenarios. The exposure of military personnel to harmful radiation was 
described as an institutional mistake. Yet as other participants discussed, such 
mistakes allowed collective learning about future nuclear safety which informed 
industrial development in the 1960s onwards. By learning about the 
consequences of radiation in war, this helped to standardize the Linear and No 
Threshold Hypothesis (LNTH) of radiation protection, which in turn led to more 
stringent safety standards for civilian nuclear energy. Numerous participants at 
different points highlighted how the nuclear industry is one of (if not the) safest 
in the world in terms of its Record of industrial accidents, in terms of public 
exposures to hazardous radioactive materials, and in terms of the strength of 
International regulation (through the IAEA, Euratom, and the NEA), and down to 
domestic regulatory bodies. There is, therefore, an emergent representation of 
nuclear safety as comprehensive or thorough, and the institutionalization of 
radiation protection standards is grounded in the results of these widespread 
exposures during the bombings in Japan, and weapons testing in United States.  
 
Though there was a positive understanding of radiation protection science 
amongst participants - which is also a contentious issue of public engagement. 
It is notable that both of these examples have clear military origins. As such, the 
findings about radiation safety were deemed by some to have been kept secret 
for too long. Some argued that findings about radiation effects upon biological 
organisms where not immediately shared in the public domain, and this strategy 
was used as a means to deflect public attention towards civilian nuclear energy 
programmes at the time. As found in a number of nuclear history studies (not 
least those of the HoNESt project) (Wynne 1982, Hall 1986, Weart 1988) the 
power of military secrecy to ‘close down’ (Stirling 2004) civil society 
engagement with radiation protection, defense programs, civil nuclear 
electricity, uranium mining, enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing both during 
and immediately after the Cold War, is significant: these issues were thoroughly 
discussed in the workshops, primarily by stakeholders who identify themselves 
as being in opposition to nuclear energy. This issue of opening up and closing 
down discussions about the social desirability of nuclear energy is discussed in 
more detail below. However, there are a couple of final points on radiation 
protection science and its relationship to engagement that are relevant. The first 
is that radiation protection within this military nuclear field was argued to have 
become first politicized in the United States during the Vietnam War:  
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“What happened in the US? The Atom is great it makes us (the USA) a 
superpower, and at the same time the opposition until 1975, during the 
Vietnam war, they were against the use of bombs, and scientists among 
them (the radiation protection scientists) are campaigning against this, so 
nuclear becomes ‘bad’.” (London group 2). 
 
It is noteworthy that the military origins of radiation protection science are 
discussed as being the origins of negative public perceptions of nuclear risk. 
One of the interesting engagement-related findings relates to the dichotomy that 
emerged between pro-nuclear technological optimism amongst the civilian 
programmes, and the government boosterism that supported civilian uses of 
technology as a consequence of Atoms For Peace; and the increasing role of 
radiation protection scientists to shape political discourse around nuclear safety. 
It is notable that participants recognized the polarizing nature of this debate. 
They commonly discssed radiation protection science has tended to push civil 
society actors into “for-or-against positions” with regards to nuclear energy. 
Consequently, this raised concerns amongst democratic decision-making 
authorities that anti-nuclear bomb protest organisations (for example in the UK 
the campaign to nuclear disarmament CND was mentioned prominently) might 
in turn become threats to civilian nuclear programmes. It was mentioned, 
particularly in London and Munich, that Government concerns over peace 
movements to stir public sentiment against civilian nuclear power became the 
primary motivating factors to shield the industry and public scrutiny. Yet this 
action was deemed unsuccessful. Participants commonly discussed the 
relationship between nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear energy in shaping 
public attitudes to nuclear technologies in the round, and in turn, creating the 
political-institutional configurations that favoured certain attitudes to stakeholder 
engagement within governmental authorities. In essence, military secrecy failed 
to contain antinuclear sentiment in civil society. The reason for this was largely 
because of the impact of nuclear accidents, the rise of televised media, and a 
broader concern internationally over the management of environmental risks to 
health and ecological stability. Nuclear accidents were universally used as key 
milestones in the visualization of the River of Life.  
 
Nuclear accidents and civil society engagement 
 
The first significant nuclear accident that was discussed was the Windscale Pile 
fire in the United Kingdom. As one participant said in relation to the fire: 
 
“The Government covered the Windscale report up, as it was a military 
experiment and the UK Government didn’t want Russia to know what 
they were up to…. They were aware that allowing this understanding into 
the public domain would stimulate public opposition and an anti-nuclear 
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movement in the late 1950s and 1960s. The growing power of CND 
(against bombs) there was concern that the public would stimulate the 
power of this organization against nuclear”. (London group 2).  
 
The Windscale fire was construed as a critical turning point for nuclear politics 
in the United Kingdom. There was perceived concern amongst the participants 
that the impact of Windscale was lessened because, firstly, it was covered up 
under military secrecy conditions, secondly, because it was geographically and 
politically remote from major population centres, and thirdly, because 
Parliament was not fully aware of the facts surrounding the case. The other two 
most significant nuclear accidents were Three Mile Island and Chernobyl (it is 
notable that Fukushima-Daichii received comparatively less attention, though 
this is likely due to timing constraints of the workshop – moving chronologically 
from past to present). The impact of both were discussed in great detail. Across 
all of the workshops these incidents were marked as key milestones in the River 
of life for the respective nuclear energy-producing nations. However, the impact 
of these events was not universal across Europe. For example, when 
discussing the United Kingdom one participant in the London workshops stated: 
 
“Three Mile Island had a small political reaction in the UK, because the 
Government had just lost a general election…. It had a big effect in 
Germany but virtually no effect in the UK” (London group 2). 
 
In other cases, the combination of Three Mile Island (TMI) in 1979 and the film 
China Syndrome in the same year were discussed in engagement terms. There 
was a sense that the combination of fictionalised nuclear catastrophe and a real 
nuclear accident became conflated in the public imagination, such that the 
nuclear fear grew in the United States, and this spread through international 
news media to Western Europe. As discussed in the Munich workshops, the 
influence of Three Mile Island on environmental protest and the rise of green 
politics was deemed to be significant and long-lasting. It was mentioned in a 
number of cases, that TMI had a significant impact upon tightening safety 
restrictions, regulatory frameworks and oversight of nuclear operations in 
western Europe and in the United States. Collectively, this provided a great 
opportunity for civil society engagement, because of the rise of televised media, 
international reporting, and a growing concern around environmental issues at 
this time.  
 
This was deemed instrumental in the rise of public fears about nuclear safety, 
which in turn influenced the types of uninvited engagement that occurred. The 
role of media reporting extends beyond just accidents however. In the UK, this 
is discussed primarily in relation to the thermal oxide reprocessing facility 
(THORP). One of the participants in the London workshop mentioned the role 
that a single headline played in shaping engagement: 
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There was a headline in 1975: “Britain to become nuclear dustbin of the 
world?” In the Daily Mirror. (London group 2).  
 
It was discussed how the media storyline around spent fuel reprocessing and 
waste management stimulated public concern for the actions of the nuclear 
industry, and there were similar examples raised in the Munich workshops 
around the proposal for a salt dome for radioactive waste in Gorleben. One of 
the aspects that could be clearly identified is that the most negative reactions to 
nuclear risks were perceived to emerge not from the siting of power stations, 
but rather from waste facilities and reprocessing facilities. Strong public 
reactions were amplified by the media reporting: these issues appear to arrive 
“suddenly” in public discourse. By this we mean that radioactive waste 
management had not been a major public concern up to the early 1970s, but 
the increased reporting of waste-related issues happened in a relatively short 
period of time.  
 
As some of the participants discussed in the London and Barcelona workshops 
in particular, media reporting of both major international nuclear incidents and 
routine planning applications for waste and reprocessing facilities, created 
grassroots political pressure to open nuclear industry decisions to wider political 
scrutiny. Then, when the Chernobyl incident occurred in 1986, this was argued 
to compound antinuclear sentiment within civil society, emboldening antinuclear 
activist organisations and leading to political pressure within many democratic 
regimes to phase out or delay nuclear decision-making. However, the effects 
were not just felt in the United Kingdom, France and Germany: as one 
participant in the Barcelona workshop discussed about Italy: 
 
[In Italy] “everything stops around Chernobyl… even the plans, 
everything turns to gas” (Barcelona group 2) 
 
Italy voted soon after the Chernobyl incident in a referendum to stop nuclear 
energy, though this was an outlier in terms of political reactions to nuclear 
energy in Europe. In Bulgaria, for example, the nuclear incidents of TMI and 
Chernobyl were deemed much less important in terms of nuclear energy 
decision-making than other geological risks: 
 
“In 1977 there was a major earthquake in Romania, the soil moved by 1 
meter the reactors survived without any damage… the experts were 
concerned, so they went to Japan and used Japanese technology, with 
shock absorbers. This caused delay, and the third and fourth [reactors] 
were put in 1982 and 1984.” (Barcelona group 2) 
 
It seems that within the USSR, participants argued that TMI was seen as a 
problem of the West, and therefore not really applicable to Bulgaria, and so 
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policy learning was perceived to occur ‘closer to home’ as shown in the quote 
about Romania above.  
 
In the democratic regimes of Western Europe, despite the growing power of 
Green politics in Germany and Sweden, the impact of nuclear accidents upon 
nuclear policy-making was also deemed be relatively small. It was interesting 
that when the Chernobyl incident was raised, it seemed that participants were 
careful not to overstate its impact on nuclear energy policy-making. The power 
of television in stimulating adverse public reactions to nuclear risk was 
discussed quite thoroughly. We can understand participants’ reactions to the 
role of international news media in stimulating risk perception as implicitly 
drawing upon something akin to the social amplification of risk framework 
(SARF). SARF is based upon the principle that some risks become “amplified” 
as messages about them are emphasised within news media, addressed by 
public officials, that stimulate scientific (and often quasi-scientific) debates in 
public forums (including in the 21st-century on social media) (Kasperson et al. 
1988, Pidgeon, Kasperson, and Slovic 2003, Petts et al. 2001). Other risks 
however become attenuated or suppressed. What was interesting about 
Chernobyl as it was discussed in the workshops, is that although it was 
recognised that the fire and resultant radioactive fallout across Europe had a 
significant immediate effect on public perceptions of nuclear risk, this effect was 
(generally) not deemed to be long-lasting. To summarise, although it was often 
stated that in the 1980s the Chernobyl incident was significant in influencing 
nuclear policy-making, other factors such as the liberalisation of energy markets 
and the “dash for gas” were deemed to have had a greater influence upon the 
quantity and supply of nuclear reactors to energy markets (or the lack thereof) 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s (specifically in the United Kingdom, Sweden 
and Germany). For example, one London workshop participant stated: 
 
“Thatcher wanted to build new nuclear, but also wanted to privatize 
everything and those two are incompatible… Market economics. Nuclear 
only works in the 1980s if the government took on board the liabilities. 
“(London group 2). 
 
Thus, although in one sense the globally televised shock of Chernobyl had a 
powerful impact on civil society engagement with nuclear energy, participants 
recognised that ultimately this had relatively little effect on the energy landscape 
of the United Kingdom, France, Sweden and Germany in the subsequent 
decade. 
 
Independent scientific advice 
Though participants tended to recognise that economic factors had a strong 
influence in the types of energy sources that were built in the 1970s, 80s, and 
90s (namely the influence of the oil crisis, conflicts between governments and 
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coalminers’ unions, and then later the ending of the Cold War), when it comes 
to looking at non-economic factors that influenced engagement with nuclear 
energy one of the most significant issues is that of independent scientific 
advice. Specifically, participants questioned the role that independent scientific 
advice plays in shaping government policy, and the availability and the types of 
scientific information brought to bear in decision-making.  
 
It is worth noting that independent scientific advice is perceived as a mainstay 
of regulatory processes and approval mechanisms within the nuclear industry. 
However, that scientists have direct involvement in nuclear matters is 
something that is debated from different standpoints. Under Cold War 
conditions, participants in workshops discussing the UK’s military programme, 
and that of France and Spain, mention that at times the nuclear industry was 
‘technocratic’ or even ‘technophilic’ (London group 1) in the sense of following 
the advice of independent scientific experts in shaping policy, and at others, 
scientists were excluded for political-ideological reasons. For example, one 
participant in the Barcelona workshop (Barcelona Group 1) mentioned The 
French 'Messmer Plan' published after the Oil crisis hit in the early 1970s. This 
is described as a top-down implementation of a nuclear policy without scientific 
support at the time. (The Association of Scientists for Information on Nuclear 
Energy was formed in response to concerns about the lack of scientific scrutiny 
of the plan (Nelkin and Pollak 1980) The common understanding of nuclear 
engagement is that in the 1960s, 70s and 80s decisions were technocratic – 
that is, they were led by scientific and technical expertise. But as discussed 
elsewhere in this report, participants often argued that broader political and 
ideological factors served, at some points in history, to crowd-out scientific 
expertise, to diminish dissenting voices, or to withhold key information from 
decision-makers, effectively engaging in forms of closure (Stirling 2006) around 
nuclear energy technology assessment. 
  
One of the key forms of ‘closure’ was identified in the milestones expressed in 
the River of life method. During discussion related to France, the United 
Kingdom, and when referring to the reunified Germany (in particular), scientific 
reports were commonly reported as ‘milestones’. For example in the UK the 
Maud report, Smythe report, and Flowers report were mentioned in succession 
(the Maud report that emphasized the use of nuclear energy for heat 
generation, the Smythe Report written by Henry DeWolf Smyth that detailed the 
development of the Manhattan project and the Allied effort to develop atomic 
bombs, and the Flowers Report that highlighted the need for a long-term 
radioactive waste management strategy before continued expansion of the 
nuclear industry could be countenanced in the 1970s). This is significant, 
because continuous technical change in the nuclear industry (as in any 
innovation sector) required the development in close proximity of publicly 
funded basic and applied research (Pavitt 1998) and the development of 
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regulatory instruments associated with scientific and technical oversight of 
operation. The reports produced by independent scientific oversight bodies are 
crucial to the development of such regulatory instruments. 
 
We can interpret scientific reporting - as represented in the workshop 
discussions - as a process that punctuates the continuous evolution of nuclear 
energy policy in democratic nations. What is relevant about this theory as it 
relates to the workshop discussions is that when scientific reports are 
mentioned, they are very often construed as socio-political artefacts that 
punctuate a continuous trend of sectoral innovation within the nuclear industry. 
To give an example: The Flowers report was discussed in the London 
workshops. The report was the first time in which a leading physicist had 
questioned the continued expansion of nuclear energy programmes in the UK, 
based on concerns around (notably) the future generational impacts of long-
lived radioactive wastes. The report was perceived as highly influential in 
restructuring the UK government approach, firstly to radioactive waste 
management (which had been largely ignored up to this point because the 
Magnox and early AGR programmes appeared to be going so well), 
undertaking site safety and anti-nuclear proliferation issues very seriously. 
Secondly, the report was influential in getting the UK governments to set up the 
nuclear industry radioactive waste executive (Nirex - a decade later). We can 
describe the report as stimulating a period of punctuated equilibrium in the 
industry, because it didn’t halt or accelerate nuclear energy production - there 
was no call for a moratorium or ban within government, although the report was 
nevertheless instrumental in altering the character of the policy landscape and 
the regulatory structures of the industry during a very short period of time, which 
had lasting-effects upon the trajectory of the industry. The extent to which 
specific reports change the policy direction of the nuclear industry in different 
regional contexts is certainly worthy of further exploration.  
 
Some scientific reports had very public recommendations. Advisory reports 
such as the Flowers report (in the UK) had a powerful influence upon the 
scientific and regulatory frameworks for nuclear energy (as discussed in the 
London workshop group 2). Yet of great significance were those scientific 
recommendations that were not public. In the Barcelona workshops with 
regards to nuclear energy development in southern Europe, and in the former 
Soviet/Warsaw pact socialist republics, and in London regarding the UK, there 
was considerable discussion about the overlapping nature of military regulation 
of nuclear sites, and the secrecy that closed down opportunities for broader civil 
society engagement with nuclear policy. In non-democratic country contexts, 
this secrecy was largely attributed to the authoritarian nature of the regime and 
the lack of transparency in governance practices. Yet this was also deemed to 
be true in democratic nations with regards to nuclear energy development; as 
participants in London group 2 discuss: 
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“Public engagement, you’ve said top secret, but the other crucial thing is 
that the UKAEA the only civil servant was responsible to the Prime 
Minister only, and not to Parliament, until 1973”. (London group 2).  
 
“It was based on “Propaganda, but not facts” (London group 2) 
 
“Magnox was a non-commercial programme for military purposes 
presented to the public as being for commercial purposes.” (London 
group 2) 
 
There is a strong narrative discussion around not just secrecy, but dishonesty. 
This was clearly discussed in relation to the British nuclear project, though 
similar counterparts were discussed in relation to the French and German 
nuclear programmes. A narrative is presented that combines the boosterist 
attitude of governments towards nuclear in the 1960s, the technological 
optimism that surrounded high-tech energy developments amongst broader 
publics, and the secrecy that surrounded the risks. What is interesting to note, 
however, is that even when such sentiments are expressed, the actual role of 
scientific advisory bodies remains largely uncontested. In other words, blame is, 
for the most part, not directly attributed to scientists, nuclear engineers, military 
officials or specific politicians. This can be understood as reflecting a broader 
trend in social discourse about the relationship between science and policy 
making. As Jasanoff (1990) notes, scientific advisory bodies have a curiously 
sheltered position within policy and regulatory systems. Advisory bodies are 
generally perceived as an indispensable aid to policy-making across the nuclear 
sector (and innovation sectors more generally). They are politically desirable 
because they are low-cost, provide competence, independence, and are 
relatively resistant to political lobbying. There were many scientific advisory 
bodies mentioned in different national contexts - these also appeared at key 
milestones within the nuclear sector development of different countries, and are 
too numerous to list here. However, various broader trends can be discerned. 
The first scientific advisors were identified primarily as physicists that helped to 
develop industrial technology for reactors of both civilian and military intent. As 
mentioned previously, promoters of the Manhattan Project, and subsequent 
domestic weapons programmes, were commonly discussed. It is important to 
note that in general, participants did not attribute negative sentiment to the 
activities of these scientists.  
 
The lack of blame is significant because of changes in cultural norms and 
practices that have emerged within modern European science governance. 
Notable among these is the concept of responsible research and innovation 
(RRI). Increasingly, we question not just the quality of science, but the 
intentions of the scientists themselves, the impacts of scientific discoveries and 
technological developments, and the role that science plays in shaping policy-
making and broader cultural trends. RRI counters the natural inclination of 
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existing scientific advisory systems to fall back on the style and culture of 
positivistic science when a problem appears complex, or when lobbying for a 
particular course of action that supports a particular interest is strong and 
influential (Frewer and Salter 2002, Taebi et al. 2014, Owen, Macnaghten, and 
Stilgoe 2012), to think through the economic, social, environmental and political 
consequences (how the positives can be amplified and the negatives 
attenuated). In short, sound science is no longer considered as sufficient 
normative justification in itself for scientific action. It is notable, therefore, that 
even when participants expressed legitimate anti-nuclear sentiments within the 
workshops, they tended to frame the position of scientists in the development of 
early nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear energy programmes in a positive (or 
at least relatively neutral) light. From analysis of the workshop data there is a 
clear sentiment (though we would be careful not to state this as universally 
accepted) that scientists “at the time” were motivated by a normative position to 
produce nuclear energy for the good of society. Expressions like “golden age of 
nuclear” or “nuclear utopia” we used to describe this early nuclear development 
phase, when there was evidence of Government boosterism of nuclear energy 
programs, relatively positive civil society perceptions, and optimism about the 
future technology. Participants were empathised with the physicists and 
pioneers of early nuclear programmes in acting in the public interest, even if 
with hindsight those participants believed that nuclear-energy was not in the 
public interest for environmental or other reasons.  
 
What was also clear, however, is that participants reported a strong reliance 
upon the input of scientific advisory bodies in policy-making, both within 
democratic and non-democratic countries. The development of nuclear energy 
in the 1940s, 50s, 60s, 70s and 80s is commonly understood as a technocratic 
era where scientific advisory bodies had considerable sway over public policy 
directions (Bella, Mosher, and Calvo 1988, Malone 1991, Blowers and 
Sundqvist 2010, Augustine 2018). This was significant because, as one London 
workshop participant expressed: 
 
“There was a proliferation of advisory bodies and committees [in the 
1960s and 70s]” (London group 2). 
 
The proliferation of scientific advice, and technical authority is discussed 
thoroughly in or all of the workshops. In relation to France and Germany this 
was interpreted conceptually as, what could be termed, State Engineering (see 
for discussion Hecht 2009 for example, Trischler and Weinberger 2005) i.e. 
there was considerable national pride in technological achievement that 
elevated the status of engineers within society. As one Munich workshop 
participant noted: 
 
“The technology is still among the best in the world and these are 
exemplary points of German engineering.” (Munich group 1).  
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The idea that technical systems and the engineers that built them are of 
particular quality and reliability is deeply important from an engagement 
perspective. Firstly, as mentioned, because state engineering is a source of 
cultural, even national pride. In the Munich workshops, there were repeated 
utterances that German engineers could be trusted, and therefore domestic 
reactor designs could be trusted to be safe. However, from a civil society 
engagement perspective participants had a more nuanced view about how this 
trust in technical authorities did not extend to political institutions that made 
technical decisions. In short, as engineering became politicised, public trust in 
the nuclear industry declined. Trust in institutions, in technical authorities, and in 
nuclear technologies, were not the same thing. For example, though engineers 
and their systems occupy a position of trust within German society, there is 
concern that this creates an aloof class that fails to engage appropriately with 
concerned public actors, to the point that the German public did not trust that 
they were being told the truth about the risks of nuclear Energy, and most 
significantly, about long-term radioactive waste disposal. This is a 
demonstration of the downside to technocratic decision-making processes. As 
the Munich participants noted: 
 
First speaker 
The language used by experts in the nuclear industry is one of the 
biggest issues of public trust…. How can we shift this burden into the 
field of trust? … Who is paying for trust in the nuclear industry. (Munich 
group 1).”  
 
Second speaker: 
 
“What we require is a common approach in language around nuclear in 
order to build this trust.” (Munich group 1).  
 
In the German case, as one participant in group 2 of the Munich workshop 
noted: 
 
First speaker: 
“The fourth nuclear programme was the basis for the nuclear energy 
getting into the Republic. As the oil crisis came over Germany, the 
energy programme planned to have around 30 reactors in Germany, and 
that was a signal for public acceptance to question public safety … 
 
Second speaker: 
“[the problem is that the government was] Ignoring public safety, the first 
reactors were the boiling water reactors and there was never a report on 
safety” 
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Third speaker: 
“[supporting speaker 2] For example, the nuclear waste disposal centre – 
a reprocessing plant combined with a storage plant for HLW. It was one 
of the main arguments of the public “well you haven’t solved the disposal 
problem, so how can we trust you?” 
 
These examples illustrate how there is a complex discourse of both pride and 
mistrust presented in the social representation of nuclear expertise, and this is 
most strongly expressed in the German case, though there were similar 
expressions when discussing France and United Kingdom. Nuclear energy was 
recognised as a means to achieve global recognition at a point of German 
reunification, and so trust in engineering was strong within the state. What is 
important to note is that scientists and engineers had (and to some extent to 
continue to have) elevated social status within civil society (this was believed to 
be true in both Germany and France). The actions of nuclear engineers in this 
period are imagined by workshop participants as a public good and something 
akin to a public technology (Bud and Trischler forthcoming) (this sentiment 
reflects the sentiments of majority opinion within the Munich and Barcelona 
workshops). In essence, there were points in history where technocracy worked 
because there was considerable trust in technical authorities, and points where 
the politicisation of nuclear energy meant not only a declining trust in politicians 
to make technical decisions, but also a crisis of trust in engineers. Thus, when 
contemporary critiques of technocratic nuclear decision-making are proffered by 
workshop participants, this is often couched as “wisdom from hindsight” in most 
cases: some lamented the lack of trust in the technical capabilities of highly 
educated and honest individuals, others pointed to the hubris of technical 
authorities to present nuclear energy as safe whilst simultaneously hiding 
information about system safety from civil society organisations. As one London 
participant put it: 
 
“There were small elites within Government. The scientists were 
genuine, but the people who supported it [nuclear energy in the 1960 and 
70s] were disingenuous.” (London group 2). 
 
Though it would be fair to say that the technocratic era was characterised as 
one where there was little public opposition to nuclear energy, this was not 
universally true across the cases. In Germany and in the United Kingdom, 
participants discussed how a lack of publicly reported safety reporting, and 
failures on waste management communication strategy (in Germany), and 
failures of public engagement around radiation protection following Chernobyl 
and in response to the thermal oxide reprocessing plant (THORP) (in the United 
Kingdom), led to growing public mistrust and the rise of antinuclear sentiment in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Germany is an important critical case for 
understanding nuclear engagement, and how relative positions of trust in 
technical authorities still lead to active anti-nuclear public sentiment, leading to 
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policy failures (Whyl is a commonly mentioned example – where the rise of anti-
nuclear activism amongst wine growers and farmers led to non-decision making 
on nuclear issues – pushing decisions on site selection back until they were 
eventually abandoned). Similar sentiments were expressed in the London 
workshops about the U.K.’s nuclear programmes, and in relation to Portugal 
and France.  
 
What is significant is the capacity of local actors to influence site-specific 
decisions over nuclear energy facilities. The Whyl example was discussed 
heavily in the workshops in Munich and serves as a critical case in describing 
how collective action forces policy change when engagement with local people 
is deemed to be insufficient. To the participants, the case represented a 
powerful example of how locally organised civil activism shapes the nuclear 
energy policy landscape both locally (in the sense of delaying the decision over 
a specific power station site), and in national terms (by stimulating collective 
protest actions against nuclear energy across Germany, and by bolstering 
green environmental political movements more broadly). Whyl is an example of 
how perceived democratic deficits at the local level of politics are addressed 
through bottom-up engagement practice. This is commonly referred to as 
“uninvited” engagement, in the sense that collective action has the capacity to 
force other forms of engagement practice within the industry and within 
government that would not have otherwise occurred (see for example Wehling 
2012).  
 
Such responses were common throughout the workshops. The influence of 
engagement in advancing or halting nuclear energy development was described 
using a number different metaphorical constructions. For example, the 
radioactive waste management issue in Spain was described as: 
 
“…the hand of politics blocking radioactive waste site selection” 
(Barcelona group 1) 
 
Or in relation to Greece, it was described as: 
 
 “We are like a dam, without an exit” (Barcelona, group 2). 
 
Social movements of opposition were not universally described in positive 
terms. Opposition movements were variably described. Some participants 
construed them as campaigners for environmental justice that countered the 
power of industry lobbyists in civil society. Others viewed them, alternatively, as 
NIMBYs, or as antinuclear environmentalists who would not embrace the 
environmental benefits of nuclear power despite the evidence to support its 
value in meeting sustainable development goals. Whether or not the 
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participants believed that the blocking of nuclear sites was desirable, depended 
entirely upon the ideological positions and commitments of those individual 
stakeholders. There was no consensus on the value of opposition and protest in 
shaping nuclear policy landscapes. There was, however, agreement that when 
engagement processes from centralised governmental and industry authorities 
were deemed to be lacking by locally affected public actors, then protest 
movements would arise to fill the perceived democratic deficit. Thus, the extent 
to which governments act on ‘getting the engagement right’ (London group 1) 
becomes an important indicator of the overall level of civil society support for 
nuclear energy.  
 
We see similar activities discussed in relation to Sweden and in France, though 
it was clearly articulated in the London workshops in relation to the U.K.’s 
nuclear energy programme. What was interesting about the UK was that 
engagement practice was primarily construed as being within the planning 
system. When civilian nuclear energy sites were proposed a perceived lack of 
local engagement was expressed: 
“Engagement with local publics, around Sellafield or Hinkley, there was 
absolutely zero” (London group 2). 
Processes of planning inquiry were deemed to be the primary mechanism 
through which local people had an opportunity to challenge the need case for 
new nuclear energy infrastructure, to articulate environmental protest concerns, 
to raise issues of radiation safety, or to mobilise counter-scientific expertise in a 
public forum. The engagement practices of the industry throughout the latter 
half of the 20th century were described in terms that Hindmarsh and Matthews 
(2008) would describe as “deliberative speak” - i.e. there was a growing 
language around consultation and engagement, but this was not backed up with 
mechanisms to provide local actors with an opportunity to challenge nuclear 
energy site proposals. As one participant described it, local people when 
consulted only had the opportunity to make decisions over: 
“the colour of the fence, or the number of lorries” (London group 2). 
The public inquiry process was important in the UK context – because planning 
(and the failures of planning processes that stimulated enquiries into THORP 
and Sizewell power stations for example) were perceived as the primary 
mechanism through which engagements took place. 
 
The only country that appeared to be perceived as a leader in local community 
engagement was Sweden. Though there was relatively little Swedish 
representation within the workshops, where Sweden was discussed it was 
identified really as an exemplar of engagement practice that draws in local 
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community support from the start, as an upstream process rather than a 
downstream process. Upstream refers to engagement practice at the point 
before a decision on site selection has been reached. Sweden was alone in 
using this kind of upstream dialogue process; in all other cases engagement 
was discussed primarily in downstream terms - decisions on the type of 
technology to be deployed, and where it should be sited, were made by either 
national or regional decision-making authorities. The scale of the decision was 
taken at the national or regional level, and so local concerns (and by extension 
those of local people) were largely perceived to have been shut out of decision-
making.  
 
There is a scalar justice (Bickerstaff and Agyeman 2009, Jessup 2014) 
argument inherent in many of the discussions around engagement of the local 
level. By scaling decisions over nuclear energy site selection at the national 
level (as a public technology for the public good, see: Bud and Trischler 
forthcoming) this creates specific forms of engagement - namely those around 
consultation, information provision or placation (Johnstone 2014, Cotton 2018). 
However, where local actors perceive a lack of opportunity to engage with 
policy decisions, they will form collective action through social movements of 
opposition in order to force decision-makers to adopt their demands (reshaping 
structure through strategic learning and coordinated action, see: Jessop 2007, 
Hay 1995, Jessop 2001). We can understand this again in terms of the opening 
up and closing down of dialogue on nuclear energy technology options. Where 
policy-making processes curtail opportunities for local people to have input in 
decisions, this in turn stimulates protest actions, unites local actors, and then 
forces policymakers to open up technology appraisal processes to a wider 
range of voices. We can see therefore that engagement is a dialectical process 
of structure and agency - when local actors lack the power to make decisions, 
they politically strategize to change the functional systems through which 
decisions are made.  
 
Conclusions 
We can understand engagement practice within the nuclear energy sector as 
having multiple dimensions at different scales of governance. Within the 
workshop discussions there are clear demarcation lines between the 
governance practices of the democratic nations of western and northern 
Europe, and the authoritarian regimes of former fascist and Soviet republics, the 
differences primarily lying in the capacity of individual actors to influence the 
policy landscape. In democratic nations and in authoritarian nations, the early 
nuclear industry was highly influenced by the actions of “heroic” scientists 
(usually physicists) who pioneered the development of both military and civilian 
nuclear technologies. The earliest engagement forms under both of these 
regimes were technocratic in the sense that scientists had considerable political 
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power in shaping technology choice. However, nuclear energy was stimulated 
by a range of structural factors which influenced both democratic and 
authoritarian regimes. The economics of post-war reconstruction required 
political investment in alternative fuels in order to stimulate industrial growth and 
development. Civilian nuclear energy carried with it considerable soft power, 
showing the technological capabilities of the nation state, in democratic nations 
providing economic opportunity through technology transfer, and in the USSR 
by demonstrating the power of collective labour. The link between civilian and 
military applications of nuclear technology was very strong during the early 
development of the industry. The hard power of nuclear weapons on the global 
stage was a powerful draw for some countries, notably the United States and 
United Kingdom. But participants discussed what could be termed the smart 
power that civilian nuclear energy programmes brought, particularly at a time 
when the established European empires were crumbling.  
 
Broadly speaking, workshop discussions highlighted the technocratic nature of 
nuclear energy policy making during the 1960s, 70s and 80s. Technical 
authorities were given considerable decision-making influence, and this was 
due primarily to a perceived trust and elevated social status afforded to 
engineers and the technical systems that they produced. When problems such 
as the management of radioactive wastes were raised, participants discussed 
how engineers could be trusted to eventually solve such problems. However, 
when nuclear waste solutions failed (and this was discussed in relation to 
Spain, the United Kingdom, and Germany in particular) this in turn diminished 
trust in nuclear engineering.  
 
Falling public trust was further exacerbated by globally reported nuclear 
accidents – TMI, Chernobyl featured heavily in the discussions (with Fukushima 
– Daichii discussed in less detail – primarily due to time constraints within the 
workshop timetable). Yet the end to technocratic authority, and the rise of 
participatory systems of governance, was deemed to be due to the power of 
collective social opposition to force non-decision-making around nuclear energy 
site selection in key cases. The most powerful transformative effects in the 
engagement landscape were commonly cited as “uninvited” forms - examples 
where collective action through social movements of opposition forced decision-
making authorities either to postpone or abandon nuclear energy sites, which in 
turn prompted broader civil society discussions on the nature of nuclear energy, 
its social and environmental desirability, and its feasibility. In the background of 
these changes to the engagement landscape is the evolution of media and 
communicative technologies. The rise of televised media and global reporting in 
the 1970s, and then rolling news media of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
made nuclear incidents such as Chernobyl, locally relevant - it increased the 
sociocultural visibility of nuclear risk on the global stage.  
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Where the River of life method commonly ended (essentially at the present day) 
many of the key milestones were around the development of social media. The 
workshops occurred during the early days of the Trump presidency, and during 
ongoing negotiations over Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union. The 
power of social media to shape public opinion, to communicate fake news, and 
to drown out scientific facts, was something that was heavily discussed in 
relation to contemporary engagement practice. When looking at engagement 
futures these elements were deeply important.  
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Part 2 - Backcasting nuclear engagement futures findings 
The backcasting methodology has three principal components. The first is to 
identify a range of different futures. The first set of futures are those that the 
participants believe are likely to happen. The second are those that the 
participants believe are personally desirable, where desirability was defined in 
normative ethical terms. Participants engage in the process of moral 
imagination - they must first imagine the future that they want, undergo an 
internal deliberation about why they want that future to happen, and then they 
must then articulate the desirability of this future and justify the choice through 
dialogue. We can understand this process of imagining desirable futures as one 
of dramatic rehearsal. In the work of John Dewey, the concept of dramatic 
rehearsal refers to a type of deliberation that has value when people find 
themselves in indeterminate situations. These are situations in which there is 
considerable decision-making uncertainty: it is not clear how to act, what to 
value, or which ends to pursue. The purpose of the workshops is to encourage 
participants to question existing routines, norms, values, roles and 
responsibilities. Imagining the future “destabilizes” the status quo – it 
encourages participants to embrace the novelties introduced by new 
developments in science and technology, and new ones that are not yet in 
place (Krabbenborg 2013, Cotton 2013), and it encourages both utopian and 
dystopian thinking about futures, to imagine the New forms of political 
governance, new structures of social organization, new social practices and 
new problem-solving capabilities. We can understand this process of imagining 
desirable futures as a dramatic rehearsal, in the sense that workshop 
participants must then undergo the ‘work of discovery’ (Fesmire 2003, Dewey 
1982, Lubling 1999): an attempt to find out, by inquiry, imagination and 
experimentation, what is at stake, which ends to pursue, and what to value.  
 
Imagined futures are necessarily personal: they reflect the individual values of 
the participant as expressed in group dialogue. However, there are a number of 
emergent themes from examination of the workshop outputs (the listed items on 
sticky notes for example) and the expressions shown in the qualitative data 
from the recorded discussions. In this analysis, we examine the dramatic 
rehearsal of backcasted futures through the development of a range of common 
scenarios. These scenarios are constructed to define the process of dramatic 
rehearsal within the workshops. They can be described as “applied fictions” 
(Bell et al. 2013), i.e. visionary narratives which provoke dialogue about the 
direction of nuclear energy engagement futures that are grounded in analysis of 
the qualitative data. Storytelling is a central ingredient in such scenario 
development (Burnam-Fink 2015). Our aim in this section is to develop the 
overarching storylines for the desirable futures identified across the range of 
workshop contexts. The concept of storylines (Hajer 1995) (or alternatively 
master frames (Snow and Benford 1992) or dominant discourses (Fairclough 
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2003, Jäger 2001)) is applied in the social sciences to describe common 
worldviews and shared ways of thinking and discussing a topic, and the ways in 
which these “capture” the narrative around the issue under consideration. In the 
following analysis, identified actors (the stakeholders) are first mapped out. 
Second, the backcasted futures to 2050 are described in terms of actions and 
the underlying conditions (assumptions) that underpin them using this type of 
narrative approach. In each narrative, the common features across workshops 
are aggregated and described as short ‘vignettes’. In the next section, specific 
action plans to meet these desirable futures (working from the present to the 
future) are discussed.  
 
Mapping stakeholders 
The first area of common ground across the workshops, concerns the types of 
actors that were identified by the participants. The stakeholder mapping process 
presented in figure 4 is an amalgamation of the identified actor groups across 
the Barcelona, London and Munich sessions. These are categorized under five 
primary headings, with subheadings for individual stakeholder groups listed. 
The five commonly identified stakeholder interest groups are: 
 
• Citizen stakeholders (which we have termed ‘publics’) 
• Industry 
• Governmental bodies 
• Experts 
• Third sector organisations 
 
We have presented a conceptual map of the identified actors in Figure _, and 
presented some indicative relationship mapping through a series of arrows 
between each of the individual groups. This is based upon the concept mapping 
done by participants and facilitators in the workshops, and gleaned from how 
stakeholder groups are discussed in the workshop dialogue. 
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Figure 4 Stakeholder map of identified actors 
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Narratives of backcasted futures 
Technological futures 
The examination of desirable technological futures was a key facet of all of the 
discussions across the workshops. Participants engaged in a process of 
participatory technology assessment – they worked to identify priorities and to 
improve environmental sustainability, cost-effectiveness and wider benefits of 
nuclear energy technology policies and innovation strategies through their 
discussions. One notable finding is that nuclear energy was rarely discussed in 
isolation from other forms of energy technology, nor was it discussed in isolation 
from other aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. We can understand this findings as 
a form of “opening up” and “broadening out” of technology appraisal. Participant 
dialogue on technological futures functioned to illuminate options, uncertainties 
and ambiguities. Participants considered the wider political debates about how 
nuclear energy is, contrary to popular representation in the media, not a binary 
decision (for-or-against), but far more nuanced. The future of nuclear energy 
engagement raised questions about different social interests, values and 
knowledges (Ely, Van Zwanenberg, and Stirling 2014), and how nuclear 
innovation fits in a broader pattern of decarbonisation, climate change 
commitment, renewable energy technology development, alternative nuclear 
futures (notably concerning fusion technology) and changes to land use and 
environmental protection brought about by broader lifestyle changes. Such a 
‘broadening out’ of technology assessment to broader social scrutiny required 
the participants to articulate systems thinking and national-international problem 
scales (Pidgeon et al. 2014). By examining the ‘broadening out and opening up’ 
of nuclear energy engagement futures, we can identify a number of distinct 
themes. 
 
Technological, geographical and governance scales 
 
As a technology assessment process one of the common features was an 
emphasis upon multi-scalar energy governance. The primarily governance 
scale that participants identified for guiding nuclear energy policy was at the 
European Union-scale. As mentioned in the Barcelona, London, and Munich 
workshops, the European Union’s Energy Roadmap 2050, and domestic 
transition laws in Spain (discussions around what would eventually become the 
Climate Change and Energy Transition Law), France (Act of 17 August 2015 on 
energy transition for green growth), Germany (Energiewende), United Kingdom 
(Climate Act 2008, Electricity Market Reform, and current Industrial Strategy) 
were commonly used as the means to frame possible nuclear energy futures, 
and the processes of political engagement that would make such transitions 
happen. Current domestic legislation on energy transition was informed at the 
member state level by this supra-national framework. Even under Brexit 
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conditions, participants were keen that the UK align its climate change and 
decarbonisation priorities with European activity, recognising that joint collective 
action within a pan-European framework was a desirable future outcome. 
 
One of the key engagement processes was deemed to be a local-to-global 
collective action on climate change. Collective action is desired universally 
across the workshops – in the sense that there was agreement that European 
citizens have a common but differentiated responsibility (Rajamani 2000) to act 
in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions, and that this responsibility required 
action at the individual, local community, regional, national, supra-national and 
international scales. Nuclear power was recognised by some as playing a role 
in this regional-national-scale action on climate change - that Government 
engagement with multi-national finance and technology investment would help 
contracts for new nuclear build, which when replacing fossil fuel-based power 
stations met the ethical requirement for an environmentally sound solution. 
Though this was a desirable future for some, there was also recognition that 
nuclear power would not be a panacea for decarbonisation of electricity 
systems, because participants did not argue for a 100% renewable solution. 
The reason for this lies in the geographic and governance scales of nuclear 
power. Requirements for cooling, minimum distances from major population 
centres, and the additional infrastructure required for grid connections were 
significant factors that were mentioned in limiting the appeal of 3rd generation 
reactor designs. The nuclear power-as-mega-project also had limited support 
due to the time frames involved. The lead time for investment, planning, 
construction and operation was deemed by some (specifically in London group 
2, Munich group 1) as being too long given the urgency of multi-scalar climate 
action. 
 
Governance across Europe was highly differentiated. For some, the desirable 
future was a pan-European super-grid – that sharing electricity across borders 
is facilitated by nuclear power, given its potential to provide consistent baseload 
generation (in the way that an intermittent renewables approach to electricity 
generation would not). The European super-grid idea (primarily discussed in 
Barcelona group 1) required stronger European integration. The underlying 
assumption at the heart of this technology solution was an increasingly 
federalised Europe, that given then-current Brexit negotiations (the workshop 
was held in late 2017), seemed like a possible outcome only if the remaining 
Member States opted to renew and accelerate the integrationist policies up to 
2050. The pan-European super-grid approach has considerable appeal for 
some, as it would allow certain member states with higher levels of nuclear 
expertise and engineering capacity to contribute, whilst others (notably 
Germany) that have domestic policies that are hostile to nuclear development 
can continue to contribute through renewables generation. This would mean a 
“division of labour” on decarbonisation transition that could be achieved through 
supra-national coordinated action. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, was an emphasis upon micro-grids. Micro-
grids are a form of decentralised and localised energy production primarily 
associated with small-scale domestic renewables, such as wind, solar 
photovoltaics, micro-scale combined heat and power, and geothermal energy. 
However, there was considerable discussion in Munich and London workshops 
about the potential for small-modular reactors (SMRs) within a decentralised 
electricity system at the micro-scale. The major desirability factor for SMRs is 
local-regional self-sufficiency and carbon reduction. Small, isolated 
municipalities could have access to secure electricity through SMR technology, 
reducing the carbon footprint of remote, rural locations. This was seen as 
having two main potential benefits. First, it was deemed beneficial for meeting 
sustainable development goals of clean and secure energy for the poorest 
communities in the developing world. The exportation of SMRs was deemed as 
a possible solution to this challenge as it would reduce air pollution risks 
associated with coal fired power stations and domestic cooking arrangements 
using charcoal (which produces particulate emissions that are bad for 
respiratory health, leading to excess deaths). Rural electrification was deemed 
as a key sustainable development policy priority, and SMRs were posited as a 
potential solution to meeting those needs. Critics, however, noted that a secure 
and safe waste management solution would also need to be implemented, 
given that many developing economies may not have the stringent regulatory 
capacity to protect public safety. Other issues such as domestic nuclear 
engineering expertise within developing countries and anti-nuclear proliferation 
concerns would also need to be addressed. Second, the benefit of SMRs was 
discussed in relation to other local applications including high energy-intensity 
industries such as a steel, cement or glass manufacturing. Participants in the 
Barcelona and London workshops argued that such industries could improve 
their self-sufficiency and ease the burdens upon grid connected electricity 
production. Though nuclear energy was by no means universally supported by 
all participants, these specialised small-scale applications garnered 
considerable support. Rather than the nuclear energy- as megaproject (i.e. with 
multi-billion Euro costs), SMRs were deemed to be desirable because they 
could be delivered on time and on cost, in a way that third generation reactor 
technologies were deemed not.  
 
As a matter of engagement, as London group 1 noted, the move towards micro-
grid renewables and SMRs would provide citizen ownership and investment in 
nuclear energy. Local or co-operative models of SMR ownership supported by 
laws to allow co-ops to sell electricity directly from producer to consumer (i.e. 
local energy market trading) would be potentially beneficial to local economic 
growth and development, and would have greater levels of societal 
acceptability. This is because individuals would have a clear stake in investment 
and development outcomes, and so models of investment around cooperatives, 
community owned energy, and co-owned investment models with public 
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authorities (public-private partnerships at the local-regional scale) were deemed 
by some to be a useful engagement solution. There is evidence that local 
ownership and investment improves the sense of energy citizenship amongst 
locally affected site communities. Evidence from community owned renewable 
energy projects has shown that co-ownership can potentially improve local 
uptake and acceptance of controversial energy technology projects (Catney et 
al. 2014, Walker and Devine-Wright 2008, Cass, Walker, and Devine-Wright 
2010) and overcomes a social gap (Bell, Gray, and Haggett 2005) between 
acceptance that a technology is necessary (in general) but not desired locally 
(what is sometimes referred to pejoratively as the not-in-my-back-yard, or 
NIMBY, problem). It was recognised that this was a potential means to engage 
communities in trust building. Co-ownership provides community oversight and 
funding choice, increasing the capacity of what could be termed energy 
citizenship (Devine-Wright 2007, Flynn, Bellaby, and Ricci 2008) or energy 
democracy (Morris and Jungjohann 2016) – public actors become active 
producers and managers of energy technologies rather than simply passive 
consumers. This was recognised in the London and Munich workshops as 
providing a potential means for social transformation and collective action. 
Citizens would take greater responsibility for climate change and for managing 
environmental risks if they had a direct say in investment and operational 
decisions for smaller-scale nuclear projects.  
 
Sustainable transformation in societal values 
 
Related to the previous point about energy citizenship, amongst those that self-
identified as anti-nuclear, there was considerable discussion around the 
transformation of social values away from consumptive lifestyles towards 
environmentally aware and socially conscious ways of living. Decarbonisation is 
of course one of the key goals amongst supporters of sustainable living as 
expressed within the workshops. Some of the changes required infrastructural 
investment and changes in resource use. There were repeated calls for 
government divestments from fossil fuels (Barcelona group 1 described such a 
commitment as an ethical change akin to the abolition of slavery), for 
governments to move away from gas as a transition fuel, to promote research 
and development in renewable energy technologies – particularly around mass 
production and efficiency gains, to move towards widespread electrification of 
the economy (including heating and transport). Under those conditions, 
particularly increased electrification, nuclear energy was seen as having a 
positive impact upon sustainable outcomes for both developed and developing 
economies.  
 
However, others viewed desirable engagement futures with nuclear energy in a 
broader sense of rethinking personal values, identities and social practices in 
greater harmony with nature. This meant a rethinking of engagement with 
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technology not simply in terms of quantitative carbon emissions reduction, but 
also the transformation of values within society. Reduction in energy use was 
prioritised over meeting a growing energy demand with new nuclear build. It is 
interesting therefore to note that disagreement on the future of nuclear energy is 
dependent upon the extent to which participants believe that a future energy 
demand gap from growing electrification can be filled either with efficiency gains 
and more renewables, or whether nuclear energy is needed. There was no 
consensus on this point, which is important to examine through further research 
– we hypothesise that stakeholder acceptance of nuclear new build is strongly 
dependent upon whether individuals perceive renewable energy technologies 
as capable of meeting growing electricity demand in the future. Though there 
was agreement that sustainability should involve decarbonisation and transition 
– the technology deployed to make this transition happen is an area of strong 
disagreement.  
 
As discussed in the London workshop however (London group 1), an important 
question arose: “with technology do we confuse means with ends?” Participants 
suggested that rather than focus upon specific technology choices, we should 
instead focus upon multiple and heterogeneous transition pathways to achieve 
sustainable development. The identification of desirable futures was described 
in terms of “outcomes rather than process – that we [society] wants clean air, 
climate security, productive lives and space for nature,” (London group 1) and 
that multiple lines of technology development can be deployed to make that 
happen. There was a strong sense that we should avoid binary choices 
between technologies in policy making, a sentiment spurred by discussion of 
the recent Brexit referendum vote, in favour of deeper engagement on what 
desirable social futures would look like through direct democratic means. 
Participants viewed nuclear energy as a means to engage with publics on these 
deeper issues about what kind of society we desire in the future, not simply 
what type of energy generation technology we desire.  
 
Education, trust and public knowledge systems 
 
Across all of the workshops there was an expressed concern that social values 
around environmental protection and sustainability were contentious and poorly 
grounded in evidence. This was expressed both by nuclear energy proponents 
and opponents in the workshop dialogue. There was a concern for the 
development of robust public knowledge systems for evaluating energy 
technology choices in the future. Recent findings in the assessment of citizens-
stakeholder backcasted visions of a sustainable Europe show an emphasis 
upon wide-ranging societal development through education (Repo and 
Matschoss 2018), and this finding is replicated here. Discussions centred 
around how to make supposedly rational policy decisions in an era of social 
media opinion-leaders, declining trust in experts, policy makers that disregard 
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scientific evidence, and the growth in ‘alternative facts’ and ‘fake news’. As 
participants in the Munich group 2 workshop put it: “we need fact over emotion”. 
There was expressed concern that as the nuclear industry moves beyond a 
secrecy model (based upon Cold War protection of nuclear knowledge) towards 
a participatory model in the era of ‘fake news’, that the quality of decisions 
made would be inevitably reduced. Participation was, in some cases, viewed as 
a threat to public safety, if decisions around energy technologies were made 
based upon popularity rather than a dispassionate examination of public health 
and environmental protection. It was recognised that public engagement with 
nuclear energy represents a social contract – publics should be engaged by 
representative authorities (decision-makers) but that in turn required twin 
responsibilities. First, it behoves governments to provide impartial information 
and communicate knowledge about nuclear energy and technological 
alternatives in a way that is “trusted, authoritative and credible” (London group 
1), and secondly it requires that citizens take responsibility for their own 
learning, and so improve what could be termed their deliberative capacity 
(Dryzek 2009) to engage effectively.  
 
One recurrent theme was the value of education in promoting positive 
engagement outcomes. It was widely regarded that citizen stakeholders have a 
small knowledge base from which to assess the quality of energy policy 
decisions. Low public knowledge about the risks and benefits of nuclear energy 
both now and in the future, was deemed an important barrier to the 
achievement of desirable engagement outcomes. A popular desirable future 
was one where, by 2050, public knowledge about sustainability and technology 
was greatly improved across Europe, and this would involve significant financial 
investment in education programmes from elementary/primary level to post-
secondary/post-16 education, and lifelong learning outcomes for adults. In 
some respects this is variation on the theme of the ‘deficit model’ of science 
communication, whereby the assumption is that a lack of knowledge leads to 
public opposition to risk-bearing technologies (and therefore that greater 
education would improve public acceptance) (Allum, Boy, and Bauer 2002, 
Sturgis and Allum 2004). However, rather than argue that increased knowledge 
would improve public acceptance of nuclear energy, participants generally took 
a more nuanced view – that increased public education would improve the 
capacity of citizen stakeholders to engage effectively with industry and policy 
bodies, to ‘speak truth to power’ more effectively and thus counter a trend 
towards populist politics among democratic nations. As discussed in the Munich 
group 1, there is growing awareness amongst citizen-stakeholders about 
environmental problems (including those associated with energy and climate 
change) but there is insufficient knowledge to know what to do next. As a 
desirable 2050 goal, investment in education to solve these problems is 
deemed the highest priority.  
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From a nuclear industry perspective, as participants in the Munich workshop 
remarked, nuclear technology development is “over in Germany” but there is 
still a need for nuclear skills in decommissioning and waste management, and 
in designing reactors for other countries. Keeping nuclear competencies 
amongst domestic nuclear industries was seen as an important priority across 
all of the countries in the workshops. As technologies advance to 4th generation 
reactor designs this will occur at the same time that ‘the old guard’ of the 
nuclear industry retires, leaving a skills gap to implement the technology. 
Enhancing such skills is difficult, given that the industry is ‘dying’ and there is 
little enthusiasm amongst the youngest members of the workforce (such as 
engineering graduates) to specialise in nuclear skills. For some, therefore, 
educational engagement in the future must try to stimulate young people’s 
interest in this field, which would be difficult under a phase out approach.  
 
It was argued that public education should not only involve top-down education 
campaigns from government sources, but also improved capabilities for peer-to-
peer learning and engagement about nuclear energy, the environmental and 
socio-economic risks and benefits. The establishment of trusted peer networks 
for knowledge exchange was deemed an important engagement future, and the 
trusted and credible authorities (such as Universities, scientific societies, and in 
some cases environmental non-governmental organisations) were suggested 
as facilitators of this type of activity.  
 
Public education and public knowledge systems were also discussed in terms of 
environmental activism and broader engagement with civil society. In Munich 
group 1 there was discussion around the value of letter writing campaigns, 
engagement with elected national and local representatives, to oppositional and 
direct-action campaigns (sit ins, marches etc.) as a means to stir public 
dialogue on energy technologies, and to improve the quality of nuclear energy 
decisions (the expression “shining a light on the topic” was used).  
 
We can see therefore that education and public knowledge are important facets 
that can be mobilised for different ends. Firstly, education is necessary as an 
engagement tool in the maintenance and enhancement of core nuclear 
competencies which will be necessary for the industry to expand or contract (as 
decommissioning and waste management skills are needed urgently). 
Secondly, education is needed to improve the core competencies of citizens in 
engaging in broader questions about energy technology choice, and 
sustainability outcomes, to counter an ‘alternative facts’ approach that values 
opinion and scientific evidence equally. Thirdly, education as peer-to-peer social 
learning (Friedmann 1984, Bandura 1977) is important in the context of societal 
transformation to sustainability – facilitating trusted and credible information 
among peer networks was deemed a necessary activity for effective 
engagement with nuclear power over the longer term.  
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Promethean technology solutions 
 
Dryzek (1997) identifies a discourse of environmental management defined as 
Prometheanism which describes an environmental orientation which perceives 
the Earth as a resource whose utility is determined by human needs and 
interests, and where environmental problems can be overcome through human 
innovation. Promethean discourse is a description of the social psychological 
processes by which participants imagine technological innovation can resolve 
environmental, social and economic problems caused by unsustainable energy 
use, and (for some participants) of those problems caused by nuclear power 
(notably waste and accident-related risks). 
 
Demonstrated within the workshops was a strong technological optimism or 
meliorism concerning developments not only in nuclear fission, but also in 
energy storage, mass production of renewables, hydrogen, and notably fusion 
energy. There was a strong sense repeated across the workshops that by the 
time the current generation of nuclear reactors in development or construction is 
brought online, they are likely to be superseded in cost and efficiency terms, by 
disruptive new technologies. As with the discussion of the histories under the 
River of Life session, there was an emphasis upon individuals – particularly 
pioneers and entrepreneurs (Elon Musk was mentioned specifically) who look to 
innovate in energy storage, micro-renewables or energy-efficient building 
materials. These innovations over the span to 2050 were considered the major 
threats to the nuclear industry, as they were deemed to make nuclear energy 
obsolete.  
The obsolescence of nuclear energy was not, however, universally agreed. As 
mentioned above, smaller scale SMRs were the most desirable nuclear energy 
transition technology, but also new fission technologies such as fourth-
generation reactor designs were popular among some stakeholders (including 
sodium fast reactors, and molten salt reactors). These were popular for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the passive safety of new designs was argued to 
resolve many of the public fears that exist around Fukushima-Daichii-era 
nuclear incidents. It was argued that molten salt reactors would be unable to ‘go 
critical’ in the same way that older boiling water reactor designs could 
potentially do. Some argued that by communicating passive safety effectively, 
4th generation designs could avoid the public opposition problems associated 
with the previous generation of nuclear reactors. Secondly, 4th generation 
designs were argued to have the capacity to stimulate a hydrogen economy to 
innovate in other areas of sustainability transition (such as nuclear-produced 
hydrogen to power cars). Though widespread adoption of hydrogen-powered 
domestic vehicles was deemed unlikely, some participants identified a niche for 
hydrogen-powered haulage vehicles (for example) which would rapidly 
decarbonize supply chains for food, commodities and other goods. Thirdly, 
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political commitments in some countries such as the United Kingdom towards 
nuclear new build and the growing importance of business innovation and 
industrial strategy were seen as key drivers for 4th generation “technology push” 
over the next 30 years. Technology innovation in this sector is thus dependent 
upon political will to fund research and development in Universities and to aid 
technology transfer capabilities to bring designs to market fast enough to meet 
GHG reduction targets in law, and to ameliorate climate change over the next 
century. Fourthly, a major driver was seen as the rapidly changing political 
conditions (notably Brexit, and an increasingly antagonistic relationship between 
Western Europe and Russia) which is creating the desirable conditions for new 
nuclear build (specifically 4th gen and SMRs) to expand in the next two decades 
in order to meet energy security of supply goals and energy poverty alleviation 
under increasingly volatile fossil fuel prices.  
The final promethean solution that was discussed in detail, is nuclear fusion. 
The primary technology under discussion was the International Thermonuclear 
Experimental Reactor (ITER) in France. This relates to European-scale nuclear 
energy governance mentioned above. Europe was seen as a leader in fusion 
energy design and technology, though this is seen as a ‘race’ with China and 
the USA to bring viable technologies to market. European governance and 
supra-national engagement with the science and technology development was 
seen as an appropriate level with which to engage civil society with fusion at 
this point in time. There was a sense that fusion was still ‘50 years away’ (and 
there was discussion about how 50 years ago, fusion was deemed to be 50 
years away). In short, there was concern amongst some participants that focus 
on fusion might lead to no actual viable low-carbon transition at the end, and so 
given that we have reliable designs for fission reactors now, the urgency of 
climate change makes investment and deployment of fission a high priority. 
Alternatively, other participants highlighted how nuclear fission would make a 
useful transition or ‘bridge’ technology (as was mentioned in the Munich 
workshop group 2) to a fusion-powered world given the level and intensity of 
scientific research into fusion globally. As an engagement issue, it was 
recognized that until a viable technology was developed, engagement with 
publics on fusion would be difficult given the largely hypothetical nature at this 
stage (mirroring the findings of Prades López et al. 2008). Others argued 
however that opening up dialogue around fusion-futures would provide vital 
citizen input into social and environmental dimensions of the technology. 
Structuring a responsible research and innovation agenda around fusion 
technology was argued to be the first goal of a backcasted fusion future.  
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Part 3 - Planning and policy making for nuclear engagement futures 
In this final section, we discuss a range of nuclear energy in society policy and 
practice solutions drawn from the foregoing discussion of backcasted futures, 
and from suggestions drawn from the Dotmocracy™ sheets. The Dotmocracy 
sheets encouraged participants to forward simply-worded policy and practice 
strategies, then comment on the opportunities and threats that these pose, and 
to score or ‘vote’ upon favourites. The voting process is not demographically 
representative and so doesn’t provide an accurate weighting of options (in the 
way that a multi-criteria decision analysis or nominal group technique would). 
However, these scores are used as indicators of stronger and weaker 
proposals.  
 
As before, we present the policy recommendations as simple narratives on 
desirable solutions, based upon our analysis of the workshop findings as a 
whole. The idea in this final section of the workshop report is to present ways 
forward – practical planning steps to improve civil society engagement with 
nuclear energy. 
 
Establish global education initiatives around energy alternatives 
Irrespective of participant opinions on the desirability of nuclear energy within 
society, there was a consensus that public education and engagement on 
energy and sustainability could be greatly improved within Europe. There was 
concern that rapid empowerment of ‘thought leaders’ on social media had 
undue influence upon public understanding of science and technology, and in 
shaping public values. Evidence based policy was deemed to be best 
implemented when citizens are knowledgeable and motivated to scrutinize 
political decisions over energy futures. The key issue for engagement futures is 
empowerment through education, public knowledge systems and facilitated 
social learning, rather than trying to achieve public acceptability of nuclear 
energy through deficit-model assumptions that increased knowledge will 
naturally stimulate public agreement with engineering authorities.  
 
The primary policy solution is to establish which individuals and organisations 
are deemed trustworthy, credible, impartial and knowledgeable enough to 
communicate this information, and facilitate knowledge exchange. Scientific 
societies (e.g. the Royal Society, German National Academy of Sciences, US 
National Academy of Sciences etc.) could play a key role. Public lectures such 
as the Royal Society Christmas lecture series, or documentaries produced by 
reputable scientific authorities (Prof Brian Cox was mentioned in the UK 
context), would be one relatively simple and cheap solution to improve 
engagement outcomes overall by forearming citizen stakeholders with 
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knowledge in advance of a more comprehensive direct democratic engagement 
process (discussed below).  
 
Such supra-national educational engagement would also have the benefit of 
stimulating interest amongst young people in pursuing nuclear career pathways, 
helping to keep nuclear knowledge current. This would benefit either pro- and 
anti-nuclear proponents, as nuclear skills have application in radiation 
protection science, decommissioning safety and waste management 
environmental protection as well as in power station development. Nuclear skills 
are therefore necessary even under conditions of phase out or moratoria on 
new build. This would provide societal flexibility in dealing with both new nuclear 
build (e.g. UK) and post-nuclear societies (e.g. Germany). Transfer of skills 
through European knowledge networks (Marie Curie fellowships, Erasmus 
schemes etc. for students and fellows), or nuclear industry associations (WNA 
for example), is a policy priority in the context of Brexit, and potentially 
contracting opportunities for knowledge exchange within the industry.  
 
Establish a mechanism for long-term nuclear waste knowledge sharing 
Similar to and related to point 1, is a need for knowledge sharing and best 
practice on nuclear waste management processes and decision-making 
procedures. It was recognized that geological disposal is becoming increasingly 
standardized through shared technology platforms, notably the Implementing 
Geological Disposal of radioactive waste Technology Platform (IGD-TP) within 
Europe (Van Goethem 2010). However, no such common platform is identified 
for engaging with heterogeneous publics on the issue of radioactive waste 
disposal in deep geological facilities, nor is there a systemic communicative 
structure set up for engagement over the long-time frames of radionuclide 
decay. As Fuji-Johnson (2008) argues, deliberation should not only occur at just 
one or two time frames early on in the planning process for a radioactive waste 
management site. Incorporating the needs and welfare of future generations is 
crucial from a sustainable development perspective. However, deliberative 
decision-making assumes that current generations are capable of making 
decisions that will be de facto agreeable to future people. A key policy priority in 
defining desirable engagement futures, is to set up the infrastructure for long-
term engagement. Though there is considerable innovation in participatory 
methodologies for evaluating radioactive waste management options (Sweden 
was held by participants as an exemplar in voluntarist site selection and 
community engagement), maintaining these engagement practices over long-
time frames has received considerably less attention and as such is a key 
backcasted engagement future to pursue. These might be standing forums such 
as citizen’s panels, funding for self-organising grassroots organisations to 
maintain community governance, and/or legislating within radioactive waste 
management decisions to revisit options at multiple future time points 
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(sometimes referred to as a 'stepwise', or incremental decision-making process 
Pescatore and Vári 2006, Cotton 2017).  
 
The desirable future engagement practices must also consider the role of long-
term site monitoring and retrievability of wastes from deep geological disposal 
facilities. There was strong evidence of support for a guardianship model of 
long-term radioactive waste management, whereby host communities act as 
stewards of site facilities over long time frames. Providing adequate resources 
for monitoring and retrievability, community compensation mechanisms over 
multi-generational timeframes, and continued democratic renewal over multiple 
decision points were agreed to be desirable engagement futures. Effective 
future engagement will also involve communication of risks in the context of 
language change and future cultural barriers to understanding. Further research 
and implementation of these cultural symbols of risk communication is needed. 
This is because decisions must be made about how to communicate 
radiological hazard information in a way that will be understandable in 10,000-
100,000 years’ time so that future human intrusion (intentional or unintentional 
can be avoided). Research into the intelligibility and durability of warning 
markers for long-term nuclear waste storage sites is required to prevent 
inadvertent human intrusion in the distant future (Lomberg and Hora 1997).  
  
Engage in responsible research and innovation around nuclear fusion 
Though the primary focus of this research has been upon fission technology-
related engagement futures; it is clear that, for many participants, fusion is the 
technological future that is desired. The ITER programme and its counterpart 
‘Tokamak’ projects (devices which use a powerful magnetic field to confine a 
hot plasma in the shape of a torus – the current leading fusion reactor design, 
see: Luxon 2002, Artsimovich 1972) in China, South Korea and the USA were 
discussed in detail. What is clear is that engagement processes around fusion 
are considerably less sophisticated than those around fission technologies, 
primarily due to the immaturity of the science and technology, and the relative 
socio-cultural invisiblity of nuclear fusion science within public consciousness 
(for example: Horlick-Jones, Prades, and Espluga 2012, Simon 2001).  
 
Within European research frameworks, including Euratom, the Responsible 
Research and Innovation platform is now well established. Under EU funding 
frameworks, RRI involves research and development practices that bring 
together multiple societal actors (including but not limited to researchers, 
citizens, policy makers, business, third sector organisations). The aim of RRI is 
to provide upstream engagement with technology programmes. This involves 
early involvement through exercises such as backcasting, foresight analysis, 
and lifecycle environmental assessment. The aim is to bring diverse 
stakeholders together to assess the whole research and innovation process in 
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order to better align both the process and its outcomes with the values, needs 
and expectations of society (Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 2012, European 
Commission 2018). 
 
It was clear from the workshop discussions that improving the upstream 
engagement (Cotton 2010, Mohr 2007, Pidgeon 2006) with fusion research 
requires additional funding, scientific and industry buy-in and sustained social 
scientific analysis. Understanding the societal risks, costs and benefits in 
advance of technological maturity will help to alleviate the potential problems 
that will likely occur as social movements of opposition move to halt technology 
implementation at the point of site selection (as seen in a range of case studies 
of siting processes for controverial energy technologies, for example: Whitton et 
al. 2017, Bickerstaff 2012, Benford, Moore, and Williams 1993, Boholm and 
Löfstedt 2004, Edelstein 2004). 
 
Investigate engagement processes for 4th generation (including small-
modular reactor) programmes 
 
The nuclear fission technologies that gained the greatest support amongst 
participants were the small modular reactors for specialized applications in rural 
development, decentralised micro-grids and heavy industrial users; and 4th 
generation molten salt reactors. These technologies are passively safer than 3rd 
generation designs, have greater technological flexibility due to their smaller 
size and cost, and as ‘new’ technologies, require upstream societal dialogue in 
the same way that fusion research does. Investigating the unique engagement 
requirements for SMRs and 4th generation reactor designs is therefore a key 
priority (for future Euratom funding for example), given the relative social 
desirability of these technologies to meet sustainable transition goals. As such 
technologies can be deployed as local decentralized systems rather than 
centralised large-scale mega projects, this provides an opportunity for 
innovation in funding, ownership and local governance models. Investigation of 
opportunities for public-private partnerships, co-operatively and community-
owned SMR technologies in particular, was deemed an engagement priority. 
The primary advantage of this approach is that it ‘scales down’ decision stakes 
for local authorities and public bodies – lead times and tax-payer liabilities are 
shorter/smaller and so perceived public liability risks are reduced. Moreover, the 
opportunity for local control through share/stock ownership, representation on 
project management boards, and shareholder meetings is one key means to 
improve engagement practice and stimulate public acceptance of nuclear 
energy technologies within host communities. Key learning on such local 
governance options can be gained from the growing literature on decentralized, 
community-owned renewables projects, where innovation in governance, 
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engagement practice and ownership has been tested (Haf and Parkhill 2017, 
Nolden 2013, Seyfang, Park, and Smith 2013, Bulkeley and Kern 2006, Rogers 
et al. 2008, Cotton 2011, Catney et al. 2014). Notable findings from this 
literature are that shared control and ownership improves community ‘buy-in’ to 
projects, stimulates shared responsibility and collective action on energy (so-
called ‘energy citizenship’) and reduced planning conflict. We argue that a key 
priority for nuclear energy development from an engagement perspective 
should therefore be SMR development and implementation, based upon 
voluntarist models of community site selection under conditions of shared 
ownership and governance.  
 
Explore appropriate mechanisms for direct democratic engagement 
 
In the action planning of the Dotmocracy session, one of the key desired futures 
is to move from consultative and one-way communicative practices towards 
more direct forms of citizen control over energy technology decisions, siting 
processes and policy interventions. We can understand this as a desire for 
strong or direct democratic control of technology (Sclove 1995, Barber 1984, 
Ely, Van Zwanenberg, and Stirling 2014). The call for expanded and 
comprehensive democratic engagement on nuclear energy was understood in 
the context of opening up technology assessment to a broad range of 
alternative technologies and applications. As mentioned in the previous section, 
nuclear energy technology futures were steered towards specialist applications 
of SMRs and 4th generation technologies within local-scale micro-grids and 
specialist industrial applications. This requires a rethinking of democratic 
decision-making on technology options – providing greater opportunities for 
direct citizen engagement with elected representatives (including local 
government, planning and parliamentary bodies). Though there was a 
recognition in the workshops that participatory engagement was relatively 
sophisticated in some aspects of nuclear policy making (the Committee on 
Radioactive Waste Management in the UK, and the Swedish and Finnish 
participatory processes on waste management and site licensing respectively, 
were discussed). However, face-to-face methods of deliberative public 
engagement were argued to be limited, as they are rarely demographically 
representative (often representing the interests of those with prior knowledge, 
time, resources and cultural capital – so participants are often retired specialists 
in the policy area). Engagement futures were deemed to be moving online – 
towards faster, more integrated methods of engagement that have broader 
reach, stronger appeal to younger participants (who were deemed to be under-
represented in sustainable energy decision-making), and with more direct 
access to public officials. 
 
Though online methods of engagement were a desirable future there is a 
perceived crisis of trust, not only in nuclear industry authorities, experts and 
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scientific knowledge, but also in democratic institutions. The rise of populist and 
far-right politics, ‘fake news’ and ‘alternative facts’ is a major concern for future 
engagement practice raised by participants. It was argued that certain direct 
forms of online discussion in internet forums were easily manipulated (through 
bots, targeted social media and polarised, often offensive contributions from 
anonymous participants). Concerns were raised that online participatory 
democracy, though potentially valuable to direct democratic engagement, would 
nonetheless be open to ‘hacking’ or social manipulation. Rebuilding trust 
requires not only trust in traditional nuclear energy authorities and decision-
makers, but engagement futures in an online world also require trust-building in 
online engagement mechanisms.  
 
One potential solution that was briefly discussed in the London workshop group 
1 was the viability of blockchain technology. Blockchain technology is one 
powerful means to enhance digital trust. Blockchain authentication verifies 
online communications and transactions at every step, it is a robust online 
accounting method that essentially eliminates the possibility of online fraud or 
manipulation (Beck et al. 2016, Hawlitschek, Notheisen, and Teubner 2018). 
Blockchain-based platforms have been applied primarily to digital economic 
transactions, in response to the advantages and limitations of online 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. However, blockchain also has relevance for 
direct democracy. Blockchain is described as a disruptive societal technology 
as it enables new kinds of disintermediated digital platforms which enable 
decentralised governance (Mattila 2016).  
 
Digital electronic voting and discussion platforms are at the forefront of 
engagement futures, yet as Pawlak et al. (2018) argue, the most important and 
prevalent problems are the lack of auditing capabilities and system verification 
methods. Blockchain can be used to develop e-voting processes and 
components of a supervised internet voting system that is audit and verification 
capable, making it extremely useful for deliberative engagement on complex 
and immediate policy issues at different governance scales. For example, 
blockchain based discussion and voting platforms such as the Rahvaalgatuse 
platform in Estonia are growing in popularity. Rahvaalgatuse is a digital 
discussion and voting platform that allows direct access from citizens to policy-
makers. Across the workshops there was a very strong call for broad, 
comprehensive and secure engagement platforms, and as a future policy and 
research programme, the investigation of digital methods that are credible, 
easily authenticated and provide direct citizen access to nuclear industry and 
policy authorities, would be a valuable approach to future engagement practice.  
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Conclusions 
Deliverable D5.3 reports upon the results of a deliberative experiment 
(Grönlund, Setälä, and Herne 2010, Caluwaerts and Deschouwer 2014, 
Karjalainen and Rapeli 2015) in the assessment of engagement practices and 
social contexts in the nuclear energy sector. Nuclear energy and its relationship 
to the political, economic and material conditions of European states is deeply 
complex and rooted in the shared histories, imaginaries, discourses and political 
ideologies of the countries in which the technology was developed and 
deployed. As previous deliverables have discussed, issues of stakeholder risk 
perceptions, economic incentives, geopolitical relationships and governance 
models have influenced the engagement practices of nuclear industry, 
regulatory, policy and civil society actors since the inception of domestic nuclear 
power electricity in the early 1950s (Espluga et al. 2018, Konrad et al. 2018). In 
this work package we extended this analysis of perceptual and societal 
engagement historical practices (ibid) and engagement principles (Charnley-
Parry et al. 2017) through primary data collection. We performed an analysis of 
the qualitative data from facilitated workshops in Barcelona, London and 
Munich: totalling 7 groups of 7-10 members undertaking 5-6 hour-long 
discussions of past, present and future engagement practices across Europe. 
Though we make no claims for demographic representation across Europe, we 
have (as is common to qualitative analysis) captured a diverse array of opinions 
and expertise, to provide rich descriptive (Miles and Huberman 1984) analysis 
of the perspectives found within our sample. The workshops were designed to 
assess stakeholder perceptions of the cognitive links and subjective 
representations emerging between past, present day practices and “idealised” 
futures for nuclear energy in society across Europe – encompassing 
perspectives from nations that developed nuclear energy programmes under 
both democratic and formerly-authoritarian regimes; and to capture 
perspectives from a range of professional backgrounds including the nuclear 
energy industry, non-governmental organisations, policy bodies, third sector, 
academic, and citizen-stakeholder groups. 
 
Through a process of iterative testing and development, we presented and 
applied a series of bespoke engagement ‘tools’ to structure facilitated workshop 
sessions We have developed and adapted methods from the literatures in 
participatory learning and action ("The River of Life", see for example: Bozalek 
and Biersteker 2010), in backcasting (e.g. (Quist and Vergragt 2006, Bibri 2018, 
Repo and Matschoss 2018) and participatory decision-making ('Dotmocracy', 
alternatively known as 'Idea ratings sheets', see in particular:  Hidalgo 2018, 
Diceman 2014). The methods deployed were consonant with the ethos of the 
HoNESt project – we have developed a co-produced and participant-led 
process of engagement, which can, in turn be adapted and applied to any 
participatory technology assessment process where the technology in question 
raises can be considered socially and ethically contentious (Cotton, 2014). With 
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this in mind Rowe’s evaluation report of the workshop process in the next part 
of D5.3 is instructive to the application of these methods in practice.  
 
One of the unique features of the backcasting analysis that we present, is that it 
is grounded in the understanding of memory and history surrounding the 
development of the nuclear energy sector across Europe. We recognise that 
imagining the future is cognitively taxing for participants (Levin 2004). Projecting 
from the present into the future, and thinking through the ethical consequences 
of such futures is difficult because, as construal-level theorists in social 
psychology have argued, the further away something seems (this is true 
temporally and spatially), the more abstract it feels (Trope and Liberman 2010). 
The basis for the workshop design was to structure the deliberative process in 
chronological terms – allowing easy mental comparison between past, present 
and future. We argue that the value in this methodology lies in the capacity for 
participants to engage in both “past thinking” and “future thinking” contiguously. 
Thus, this methodological ‘toolkit’ of engagement activities helps to overcome 
the problems of overly abstract thinking. The construal of engagement futures 
grounded in the past, helps to move participants from abstract to concrete 
visualisation (Fischhoff 1999, Förster, Friedman, and Liberman 2004) through 
comparisons, hypothetical scenarios, and practical action planning.  
 
When examining past engagement practices there are a number of key 
findings. The first is that in terms of stakeholder perspectives on past 
engagement practices, the overarching factor is the political ideology of the 
nation state and the trans-national ideological structures of the Cold War that 
have the strongest influence. Under authoritarian regimes of Warsaw pact 
countries, the socialist political governance models allowed for direct citizen 
engagement with the state, though this had little influence upon decisions over 
nuclear energy. The ideological ‘push’ of Atoms For Peace, and the soft power 
that nuclear energy grants to nations that possess it, overcame local concerns 
(where they existed) about specific facilities. Nuclear power has been construed 
as a national-level imaginary that embodies state power, national identity, ideas 
of self-sufficiency and technological prowess that marked the modern state. 
This was true in both democratic, formerly fascist and formerly socialist states. 
We can understand nuclear energy development therefore in a socio-material 
context – concerns about ‘peak’ fossil fuels, declining reserves, ecological 
limits, economic shocks (such as the oil crisis), and competing technological 
regimes (between East and West during the Cold War) all had a compelling 
effect upon the types of engagement that emerged, the types of technologies 
(such as close ties between civilian nuclear energy and nuclear weapons during 
the industry’s inception in many European states), and ways in which political 
authorities involved (or more often didn’t involve) citizens directly in decisions.  
 
Engagement with nuclear energy is therefore a part of (and indeed we argue a 
driver of) democratic renewal. Though decisions were ‘top-down’ in 
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authoritarian political regimes due to the nature of the institutional structures of 
decision-making, in democratic nations it was the Cold War and the ties 
between military secrecy and nuclear energy that suppressed opportunities for 
civil society involvement in nuclear energy decision-making. Citizens were 
commonly represented by proxy, through experts of various types. Public safety 
was perceived to be understood as a matter for technical authorities, and the 
biggest opportunities to ‘open-up’ (Stirling 2004) political dialogue on nuclear 
energy commonly occurred after the publication of major reports and committee 
findings chaired by scientists in Western European democratic countries. This 
has since been expanded to include citizen voices, as the participatory turn in 
nuclear energy decision-making (Bergmans et al. 2015, Saurugger 2010, 
Sundqvist and Elam 2010) has created a culture of citizen involvement in 
techno-scientific decision-making.  
 
When projecting engagement contexts into the future, our research finds a 
range of recurrent themes. The first concerns the role of nuclear energy in 
shaping societal values over sustainable transformation. Nuclear energy was 
perceived through myriad heuristics, biases and subjective associations by our 
different participants. The symbolic interactions that surround debates over the 
renewal of nuclear energy remain highly polarised between for-and-against 
positions, as we might expect given the controversial nature of the technology. 
This polarisation concerns the extent to which nuclear energy influences 
sustainable values amongst broader populations. There was widespread 
recognition that climate change is an imminent threat to society, that global 
collective action is required, and that transformation of electricity systems 
towards low carbon alternatives is an urgent facet of a global response. It is 
interesting to note, however, that although there was no consensus on nuclear 
energy as a solution to this problem amongst participants, there was some 
recognition for specific applications for nuclear energy technologies, such as 
small modular reactors (SMRs) for specific applications such as in remote or 
isolated communities, for specific industries or sectors of society (such as large 
energy consumers like steel manufacture, isolated research facilities or 
hospitals), and towards future nuclear fusion technologies that may emerge and 
these two aspects remain a key area of future work into public perceptions of 
nuclear energy technologies. 
As an engagement practice, smaller scale nuclear technologies were generally 
preferred as part of decentralised micro-grid systems, and the technological 
future for nuclear energy was primarily framed in those terms. Of great focus 
were the scales of governance through which nuclear energy is decided. There 
was recognition that the history of nuclear energy and society is dominated by 
technocratic decision-making processes - top-down decisions driven by expert 
committees, with decisions only opened up after committees have made their 
conclusions. As shown in other studies of large technical systems (Goldthau 
2014), we find the participants recognised that large-scale nuclear energy is 
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symbolically representative of a centralised system of decision-making authority 
as well as a centralised system of energy generation. As the future of 
engagement was generally agreed to be one of greater flexibility, democratic 
capacity, transparent information exchange, rapid knowledge dissemination, 
and local citizen involvement, it was argued that nuclear energy should be 
reshaped to fit this governance model. Thus, scaling down the technology to the 
municipal level through SMRs, alternative nuclear technologies (such as 
thorium reactors etc.) was a common feature of nuclear engagement futures.  
 
A recurrent theme around engagement is that of education, of knowledge 
transfer, and of systems of decision-making. It was generally agreed that more 
education, not only around nuclear energy and its impacts, but also about ways 
to transform society to become more sustainable overall, were of a high priority. 
Yet with the rise of social networks of knowledge dissemination, fake news, 
distrust in scientific and technical authority, and increasingly polarised political 
environment (with the rise of the alt-right for example), there was considerable 
concern that engagement itself was untrustworthy. In an era when facts cannot 
be trusted because of a deluge of misinformation through vested interests, and 
the biases and heuristics that individuals employ to understand information, 
there was concern that a future for engagement would become a dystopian 
world of relativism – where truth could not be discerned from propaganda. 
When it comes to engagement practice an increasingly online world of debate, 
providing systems of trustworthy and accountable knowledge dissemination 
around nuclear energy are a high priority. For the nuclear industry itself, this 
requires a widespread adoption of principles of ethics of transparency within 
current and future engagement practice. In political situations where nuclear 
energy is not trusted by citizens due to concerns over nuclear safety, 
environmental risk, weapons proliferation, and the secrecy of the past, it 
becomes increasingly important in an era of fake news that industry bodies, 
public authorities, and their critics (including environmental non-governmental 
organisations and protest groups) be truthful, base their arguments in sound 
evidence, and avoid polemic.  
A desirable future of nuclear energy and society has multiple facets. It is one 
concerned with reducing the “decision scales” surrounding technological 
development and the provision of local decision-making control. It concerns 
greater integration of smaller scale nuclear energy technologies which can be 
integrated into decentralised energy systems. It involves broad commitment to 
transparency and fair argumentation in the face of misinformation and vested 
interests. Finally, it concerns the development of secure online platforms for 
transparent deliberation which must be maintained over the life cycle of nuclear 
energy projects and beyond, given the long time-fames of maintaining nuclear 
safety from decommissioned sites and radioactive waste management facilities.  
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Evaluation of the HONEST Stakeholder Engagement Events  
 
Introduction 
 
Three stakeholder engagements events were conducted for HONEST in 
Barcelona (September 2017), London (January 2018) and Munich (April 2018). 
These events included both a dissemination element, in which key findings from 
the project were communicated to stakeholders through presentations, and an 
interactive element, in which stakeholders were involved in a facilitated 
‘backcasting’ exercise (for Work package 5). The Barcelona event took place 
over two days (or more accurately, one-and-a-half) and followed a ‘summer 
school’ at the University Pompeu Fabra; the London event (at the Science 
Museum) and the Munich event (at the Deutsches Museum) each took place 
over one day. See the previous sections of this report for more details including 
programs. In order to learn from these exercises, and to confirm the ‘validity’ of 
their processes and findings, a light-touch evaluation was conducted, the 
learnings from which informed the nature and conduct of subsequent events. 
 
The Evaluation: Principles and Process 
‘Evaluation’ is an important concept given that engagement events tend to cost 
money (in this case, European taxpayers’ money) and can have significant 
policy implications. Generally speaking, evaluation is meant to provide some 
assurance to relevant parties (stakeholders, policy makers, tax payers, etc.) that 
a process is unbiased and of good quality. However, the concept of ‘quality’ is 
not a simple one, and is nuanced. In this section, the issue of ‘what is 
evaluation?’ is briefly explored.  
 
Just as there are uncertainties as to how best to conduct stakeholder 
engagement processes, there are uncertainties as to how best to evaluate 
these. One major area of debate in this area is whether it is possible to derive a 
generic evaluation framework that can be used to evaluate all instances of 
stakeholder engagement, or whether each instance of engagement is so 
specific in its aims that this is infeasible. Rowe and Frewer (2004) have argued 
for the former: they contest that, though the aims of any particular event might 
differ at one level, they are similar at a higher level. That is, all instances of 
‘stakeholder engagement’, and its relative, ‘public engagement’, seek to achieve 
similar goals, and that similarity is part of what defines them. Various authors 
have sought, then, to stipulate what those common goals might be, defining 
‘evaluation criteria’ against which the success or otherwise of any event might 
be judged.  
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This is not the place to go into a review of different evaluative frameworks 
(although there are relatively few coherent examples of these). One framework, 
elaborated in Horlick-Jones, Rowe and Walls (2007) sees engagement events 
(whether involving stakeholders or the public) as information systems. They 
conceptualise the fundamental purpose of engagement as the efficient 
elicitation and combination of information from all parties involved to produce a 
comprehensive and accurate output (which may then be used by the event’s 
‘sponsors’ in whichever way they please). Thus, they suggest that one way to 
view the effectiveness of any engagement event is according to the efficiency 
with which information enters, travels through, and emerges from it, and their 
concern is with recording barriers – structural, behavioural (etc.) – that can lead 
to ‘information loss’ (where some of the entirety of theoretically relevant 
information is omitted, corrupted, mistranslated). The theoretically relevant 
information comprises all that which might have a bearing on understanding 
(and potentially resolving) the issue about which the engagement is concerned. 
The emphasis on identifying places of information loss (poor ‘information 
translation’) emerges because the full nature of theoretically relevant 
information cannot practically be known (i.e. and hence, Horlick-Jones et al 
have not suggested attempting to detail it – for to detail it would essentially be to 
solve the problem that the engagement is addressing). Efficient information 
translation therefore relies upon the presence in an engagement event of all 
appropriate stakeholders (who may or may not include the public) that 
potentially have information relevant to the problem. It requires a clear 
presentation of the problem, and all associated facts, to those participants from 
the ‘sponsors’ (or the ‘organisers’, when these are contractors for the sponsors). 
It requires the availability of a suitable environment in which dialogue can take 
place between the relevant stakeholders (suitable in terms of physical and time 
resources, and in terms of efficient process management, such as through one 
or more facilitators). And it requires suitable methods and resources to 
accurately and comprehensively record and combine the output from the 
dialogue between the stakeholders. This is the conceptual idea behind the 
current evaluation. 
 
It is also important to note, however, that the different parties involved in any 
event may have differing understandings as to what makes that event efficient 
or a ‘success’. One approach to dealing with this issue is to essentially ask the 
different parties involved what they think of the event using open, un-framed 
questions (establishing the participants’ implicit evaluation criteria). This is an 
approach that Rowe and colleagues have used in a number of major past 
engagement events – in EU projects and elsewhere – usually finding that 
participant criteria do indeed mirror the main concepts of ‘information 
translation’ though often using different expressions and language.  
 
For this project, because the evaluation was not foreseen as a specific and 
significant activity, and because the evaluator (Rowe) was also a member of the 
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organising team and was actively involved in the facilitation of the events, the 
evaluation was limited to an analysis of participant responses to a standard 
questionnaire (see Appendix 1). In a full-scale evaluation using this framework, 
the evaluator would normally provide additional commentary based upon use of 
an observation protocol as well as commentary based on an analysis of event-
related documents, but these activities would be time-consuming and 
methodologically questionable because of the evaluator’s potential ‘vested 
interests’ in the success of the events. The questionnaire (Appendix 1) includes 
a number of questions asking about aspects of ‘information translation’, as well 
as some more pointed questions about participants’ beliefs on the success of 
the event in which they took part, plus open questions from which implicit 
evaluation criteria might be established. This questionnaire is based upon one 
used in past projects (e.g. the EU projects VOICES and INPROFOOD) that has 
been found to be useful; it is deliberately brief, in recognition of the practical 
difficulty in asking participants to complete long questionnaires at the end of an 
event and in recognition of the fact that sending such a questionnaire to be 
completed and returned at a later date invariably yields a very low response 
rate.  
 
Responses to the Participant Questionnaire 
 
The participant questionnaire was handed out to all participants at the end of 
the three stakeholder events, with a request that they be completed then and 
there. About 10 minutes was allowed in the respective programs for this, 
although participants could, of course, spend longer if they wished to do so. 
Typically, however, participants tended to spend less time than allotted, with a 
number leaving before they could complete the questionnaire (which is usual in 
such events). Eleven completed questionnaires were attained from each event, 
giving 33 responses in total. These represented approximately two-thirds of 
participants attending the events (accurate numbers are difficult to confirm, 
given that some registered participants did not attend while some non-
registered participants did, and furthermore, at the Barcelona event a number of 
participants related to the project and attending to help with the prior summer 
school also stayed to take part).  
 
The first set of questions asked participants whether they believed that they had 
received important information of various types, such as what the event was 
about, whether the aims were clearly specified, and whether participants 
believed that those attending were appropriate for the event (the latter question 
indicates the presence/ absence of other needed information, rather than 
anything about information communication by the organisers). All of these are 
important aspects, arguably needed by participants so that they have adequate 
information about their roles and what is expected of them. Put another way, it 
is difficult to argue that the absence of such information would in any way be 
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beneficial to participants and the process - that is, the absence of such 
information is at best neutral, at worst, negative. 
 
Table 1 summarises the answers to the first set of questions. Participants were 
generally clear on what the events were about before attending, although there 
was significant uncertainty at the first event (Barcelona), with several 
participants indicating that they were not clear about event aims, and this led to 
changes in program design when advertising the subsequent events (to better 
manage expectations). Clarity in the statement of aims at the outset of events 
was also generally good, again evolving across the three events, so that by the 
final one (Munich) the team had improved their communication style and 
content (note the dip from Barcelona to London, which was caused by a change 
of event style that reduced clarity of purpose regarding the balance between 
information dissemination and the dialogue element).  
 
The second two questions in Table 1 dealt with informing participants about why 
they and others had been invited to attend the events, and on this matter, there 
was considerably greater uncertainty. This is perhaps understandable, as 
invitations were generic through various lists and contacts rather than through 
direct personal invitations and so the recruitment drive varied across events, 
with anyone wishing to attend being allowed to do so. Nevertheless, the 
process of explaining the recruitment process to participants – largely to 
assuage potential concerns that there might have been a biased selection 
process – could have been improved. 
 
Table 1. Responses to questions about provided information 
Question Barcelona (N=11) London (N=11) Munich (N=11) 
Was it clear from 
the information 
you were sent 
prior to the event 
what the 
workshop was 
about? 
Yes = 45.5%  
Unsure = 27.3% 
No = 27.3% 
Yes = 63.6%  
Unsure = 36.4% 
No = 0% 
 
Yes = 63.6%  
Unsure = 36.4% 
No = 0% 
At the start of the 
workshop, were 
the aims clearly 
specified? 
Yes = 72.7%  
Unsure = 9.1% 
No =  9.1% 
Blank = 9.1% 
 
Yes = 63.6% 
Unsure = 27.3% 
No =  9.1% 
 
Yes = 91.0%  
Unsure = 9.1% 
No = 0% 
 
Was it clear to you 
from the 
information you 
were sent prior to 
the event why 
Yes = 36.4%  
Unsure = 18.2% 
No =  18.2% 
Blank = 27.3% 
 
Yes = 45.5%  
Unsure = 27.3% 
No =  9.1%% 
Blank = 18.2%  
Yes = 54.5%  
Unsure = 36.4% 
No =  0% 
Blank = 9.1%  
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YOU were 
invited? 
Was it made clear 
to you how the 
participants for 
this event were 
selected? 
Yes = 18.2%  
Unsure = 45.5% 
No =  36.4% 
 
Yes = 18.2%  
Unsure = 9.1% 
No =  63.6% 
Blank = 9.1% 
Yes = 36.4%  
Unsure = 9.1% 
No =  45.5% 
Blank = 9.1% 
 
The issue of the balance of attendees is important, and so a further question 
asked: “Do you think the audience was appropriate for this event?” Participants 
were also invited to suggest participants who should have been present but 
were not. This issue has a bearing on the effectiveness of information 
translation, as missing or inappropriate participants can ensure that some 
important information is absent the discussions or, in the latter case, that 
irrelevant information is present instead. At the Barcelona event, 82% replied 
that they thought the audience was appropriate; at London this was only 36.4%, 
and at Munich the figure was back to 82% (all other respondents at the three 
events responded that they were ‘uncertain’, save for one at Barcelona who 
answered ‘no’). This suggests that there may have been some issues with the 
London event. Answers to the open question help elaborate on this matter – at 
least on notable omissions: 
• Six respondents from Barcelona answered this question, with two noting 
industrial or practitioner stakeholders who might have been invited (e.g. 
nuclear engineers), two suggesting participants from other countries 
(Spain and Italy) and two providing the actual names of important 
experts; 
• Six respondents from London answered, giving a wide list of omissions, 
including: government representatives/regulators (mentioned by four), 
NGOs (mentioned by two), nuclear operators, media representatives, 
NIA representation, members of the public, named individuals, and a 
broader gender/racial/cultural mix; 
• Four respondents from Munich answered, mentioning media 
representatives, NGOs, a wider range of stakeholders (generically) and 
more participants from outside Germany. 
The frequent naming of government/regulator omissions at London suggests 
that this may have been the main source of uncertainty about the completeness 
of stakeholders there. Of course, some of these stakeholders are more difficult 
to access and convince to attend events such as this than others, but these 
answers are helpful in thinking on future events and indicating perspectives that 
might not be fully included in dialogic element.  
 
The second component of the translation model concerns how information is 
elicited from the participants within the engagement process (as opposed to 
 
  
 
 
D5.3: Backcasting futures for nuclear energy and society: a qualitative analysis of European stakeholder 
perspectives 
86 
being communicated to the participants by the organisers and, to a degree, by 
other participants). Good translation requires information to be fully and fairly 
elicited from all participants, so that it becomes available for consideration by 
other participants. Aspects of the design of an event, and how it is enacted (e.g. 
moderated) can help or hinder such elicitation and the free flow of that 
information within the system. Several questions addressed this aspect. 
 
Two questions asked participants their views on whether they had been given 
adequate opportunity to talk – i.e. to provide information to the 
organisers/sponsors/other participants in return for (and in response to) the 
information that they had received. Table 2 records the responses to these. 
When asked whether they had the opportunity to say what they wanted to say, 
participants were generally positive, especially in the Barcelona and Munich 
events, where those who answered either indicated that they had said ‘all’ or 
‘most’ of what they had wanted to say. The London event appeared somewhat 
different: although still positive overall, those indicating they had said ‘all’ was 
matched by those who had only said ‘a little’ (‘most’ was the dominant 
response). In this case, the presence of one highly dogmatic and 
knowledgeable individual within one of the break-out groups could have 
accounted for this (indeed, subsequent comments suggest that this was at least 
partly the reason). This demonstrates the need for firm facilitation of group 
discussions but also shows how one or two voluble individuals can unbalance 
discussion leading to ‘information loss’. With respect to time availability, again 
there was an anomaly: those in Barcelona and Munich generally felt that 
discussion time was sufficient, but in London there was an almost even split 
between those who were positive and those who were negative.  
 
Table 2: Responses to questions about opportunity to contribute 
Question Barcelona (N=11) London (N=11) Munich (N=11) 
During the event, 
did you have the 
opportunity to 
have your say? 
I said: 
All… =  54.5% 
Most... = 36.4% 
A little… = 0% 
Nothing… = 0% 
Blank = 9.1% 
I said: 
All… = 18.2%  
Most… = 63.6% 
A little… = 18.2% 
Nothing… = 0% 
 
I said: 
All… =  54.5% 
Most... = 36.4% 
A little… = 0% 
Nothing… = 0% 
Blank = 9.1% 
Was there 
sufficient time to 
discuss all that 
needed to be 
discussed? 
Yes = 72.7%  
Unsure = 18.2% 
No = 9.1% 
 
Yes = 54.5% 
Unsure = 0% 
No = 45.5% 
 
Yes = 72.7%  
Unsure = 9.1% 
No = 9.1% 
Blank = 9.1% 
 
 
Two open questions attempted to elaborate on where there were gaps in 
discussions. One question asked: “Do you think there were any significant 
issues that were NOT discussed, but which should have been? What were 
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these?” From Barcelona, a couple or respondents suggested that time was an 
issue generally, but in terms of specific issues the only ones named were: ‘the 
role of circular planning on energy policies and the growing scarcity of raw 
materials and its role on the geopolitics and therefore on energy reliability’; 
‘waste management’; ‘the relation between nuclear and space (deep space, 
solar system) exploration’, and ‘other potential generation’. In London, the 
issues mentioned were: ‘learning from other countries (the workshop was solely 
UK focused)’; ‘climate change and… the urgent need for decarbonisation’; 
‘phase out’; ‘public and stakeholder engagement in nuclear and new build and 
radioactive waste decisions’; ‘good practice/lessons learned’ from the country-
by-country comparisons (mentioned by two); ‘energy system issues’, and, 
generally, ‘more about what the project has found’. In Munich there were fewer 
concerns: one noted general time limitations, one asked about ‘public opinion 
versus public opinion in the media’, and two others suggested expanding 
consideration beyond Germany and comparing to other Eastern 
European/European countries.  
 
A related follow-up question asked “Were there any significant issues raised at 
the workshop that were not resolved? If so, what issues were these?” In 
Barcelona, the topics identified were: ‘repositories’; ‘the uncertainty of climate 
change events on the organisation of countries’ relationships and social 
change’; ‘new technology (rather a black hole that we don’t know much about)’; 
‘how democracy should work when thinking about the future of nuclear society 
(representative vs direct democracy)’; ‘the difficult relationship between 
(democratic) government and public (that is not homogeneous)’; and ‘the level 
of involvement of public(s) in RWM’. A couple of participants suggested that 
most issues were ‘unresolved’ because of limited time. In London, identified 
topics included: ‘need for new reactor demonstration projects’; ‘comparative 
learning from the country reports’ (noted by two); and ‘instrumetalised bias’. 
Three other participants suggested that there were general issues with timing, 
the discussion going off-topic, or there not being the relevant stakeholders 
(possibly policy makers) to ensure something useful would emerge from the 
discussions. And in Munich, the topics mentioned were limited to waste 
(mentioned by two participants) and implementing future visions (with a couple 
more noting how time limitations curtailed resolving issues fully).  
 
Of course, time was limited at all of these events for pragmatic reasons, as it 
can be difficult to gain attendance of important stakeholders over more than one 
day, and hence not everything in the complex domain of nuclear energy in 
society (across many countries) could be discussed. Nevertheless, the issues 
identified above, over the three events, are worth bearing in mind as potential 
targets for further dialogue. 
 
Another issue concerned with good translation is the adequacy with which 
participants’ views are understood and recorded by event organisers. One 
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important process that often takes place in engagement events may be termed 
the ‘summing-up’; it occurs when the moderator reflects back to the participants 
what they believe the participants have been saying - as a kind of validity check 
– or the participants themselves report back what was discussed in their 
groups. Sometimes such ‘summing-up’ occurs at the end of an event, 
sometimes after every section (question/ exercise) of an event… and 
sometimes it just does not take place at all (and in such cases - we would argue 
- this is generally a mistake, as it means a good opportunity for allowing 
participants to clarify their views or contest interpretations is missed). One 
question asked: “Do you think the summing up accurately reflected what was 
discussed at the workshop?” There was a distinct difference between the three 
events here: in Barcelona and Munich, participants were positive (in Barcelona, 
82% answered ‘yes’ with the rest ‘uncertain’, while in Munich, all those who 
answered – seven of 11 – answered ‘yes’), while responses in London were 
equivocal. In London, nearly half (45.5%) answered that there had been ‘no 
summing up’, while the remainder were evenly split between the other options 
(yes/uncertain/no – 18.2% for each). Indeed, in London the tight schedule did 
mean that there had been no summing up at the end of the event per se (there 
may have been elements of summing-up within the different break-out 
discussion groups), and discussions within the organising team afterwards 
revealed an unhappiness about this that led to a revision of the program for the 
Munich event to ensure that there would be scope for this activity (arguably 
demonstrating how evaluation, or at least self-reflection, can lead to enhanced 
event design).  
 
A trio of questions asked more directly about the participants’ opinions about 
the events. Table 3 shows the responses. In response to the question, ‘overall, 
do you think the workshop was well run?’, not a single participant over the three 
events answered ‘no’, and in fact, for the Munich event, every respondent 
answered ‘yes’. Again, in terms of ‘satisfaction’, the large majority over all three 
events described themselves as either ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ satisfied, with only the 
London event really revealing any dissention to this. In London, around one-
third of respondents indicated that they were ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’ 
(a neutral rating), with a solitary respondent giving a negative rating (‘not very 
satisfied’). In terms of ‘expectations’, the London event was again the least 
positively rated overall (two respondents indicated that the event had not lived 
up to their expectations), with Munich the most positive.  
 
Attached to these closed questions were a number of open questions asking 
respondents to describe reasons for any negative evaluations. In line with the 
general positivity, there were few responses to these. One respondent from 
Barcelona suggested that the workshop attempted to debate ‘too wide (a) topic’, 
with another saying they expected more in-depth analysis (these issues clearly 
being two sides to a single problem). A single respondent from Munich also 
expected more analysis of the ‘whys’ as opposed to just the ‘whats’. From 
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London there were more responses: one respondent suggested that ‘there was 
a lack of clarity in communicating the purpose, aims and desired outcomes of 
the workshop… (and) it was not clear how the outputs of the workshop would 
be used’; another suggested that ‘the opening presentation was good but the 
workshops were problematic as they did not follow on from the comparative 
atomic history profiles’; and another wrote of a ‘late start; inconsistent 
timekeeping’. In terms of expectations, one London participant ‘expected more 
on the country-by-country comparisons’ and another expected (or wanted) 
‘more time to be devoted to discussing the future’. 
 
All-in-all these are a good set of results and suggest that the participants viewed 
the events positively, with a slight dissention in London, where the organisers 
had attempted to reduce a one-and-half day event (from Barcelona) into a 
single day, and clearly did not do so perfectly, although the learning from that 
event led to further tweaks to the program and processes leading to very 
positive responses from participants from the final event. 
 
Table 3: Responses to general evaluative questions 
Question Barcelona (N=11) London (N=11) Munich (N=11) 
Overall, do you 
think the workshop 
was well run? 
Yes = 82.0%  
Unsure = 18.2% 
No = 0% 
Yes = 63.6%  
Unsure = 36.4% 
No =  0% 
 
Yes = 100%  
Unsure = 0% 
No = 0% 
How satisfied 
were you with the 
event overall? 
Very =  63.6% 
Fairly = 36.4% 
Neither = 0% 
Not very = 0% 
Not at all = 0%  
Very =  27.3% 
Fairly = 27.3% 
Neither = 36.4% 
Not very = 9.1% 
Not at all = 0% 
Very =  27.3% 
Fairly = 72.7% 
Neither = 0% 
Not very = 0% 
Not at all = 0% 
Did the event live 
up to your 
expectations? 
Yes = 63.6%  
Unsure = 27.3% 
No =  9.1% 
 
Yes = 54.5%  
Unsure = 27.3% 
No =  18.2% 
 
Yes = 82.0%  
Unsure = 18.2% 
No =  0% 
 
 
The first two sets of questions considered the flow of information to participants 
and the flow of information from (and between) participants within the workshop 
process (and another set looked at general perceptions of how the event was 
run). At the end of the process there arises the issue as to what will happen to 
the results/outputs, and what impact these may have – on the participants 
themselves, and on wider events – such as European policy. From an 
information translation perspective, if the results from the process are gathered 
into a report, but then nothing further arises from this, then information loss 
might be considered total, with the project being deemed a failure irrespective of 
how well an event had gone. Of course, impact is difficult to judge at this stage 
and often emerges well beyond the end of a project such as HONEST. At this 
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stage all that can be considered is immediate impact, and potential or desired 
impact. In the participant questionnaire, several questions addressed these 
matters, and Table 4 summarises the results from the three workshops. 
 
One clear sign of impact is whether participants were in some way changed as 
a consequence of their involvement in the event. One issue is whether 
participants learnt anything from the workshop. Therefore one question asked: 
“Did you learn much from the workshop?” Almost all respondents indicated that 
they had either learnt ‘a lot’ or ‘a little’ (with Barcelona respondents particularly 
positive), with just a couple of respondents to the London event indicating that 
they were ‘unsure’ about whether they had learnt anything new (and none 
declared that they had learnt nothing). The higher figure for Barcelona perhaps 
reflects the fact that this event took place over one-and-a-half days (rather than 
one) and also followed on from a summer school, so it may be that some 
participants were thinking about the wider set of activities rather than the 
workshop per se. In general, these are a good set of figures, bearing in mind 
that participants comprised expert stakeholders and not simply members of the 
public, and hence these could be expected to already have deep knowledge on 
the issue at hand. 
 
Table 4: Responses to questions about immediate or expected impact 
Did you learn 
much from the 
workshop? 
A lot = 54.5%  
A little = 45.5% 
Unsure = 0% 
Nothing = 0% 
A lot = 9.1%  
A little = 72.7% 
Unsure = 18.2% 
Nothing = 0% 
A lot = 18.2%  
A little = 72.7% 
Unsure = 0% 
Nothing = 0% 
Blank = 9.1% 
Did participation 
in this event 
change your 
views on the 
issues in any 
way? 
Considerably = 
9.1%  
Some =  45.5% 
Unsure =  18.2% 
No =   27.3% 
 
Considerably = 
0%  
Some =  45.5% 
Unsure =  18.2% 
No =   36.4% 
 
Considerably = 
0%  
Some =  27.3% 
Unsure =  27.3% 
No =   36.4% 
Blank =  9.1% 
Do you think this 
event will have 
any influence on 
relations between 
nuclear industry 
and society? 
Yes = 36.4%  
Unsure = 45.5% 
No =  18.2% 
% 
 
Yes = 45.5%  
Unsure = 36.4% 
No =  18.2%% 
 
Yes = 0%  
Unsure = 45.5% 
No =  45.5% 
Blank = 9.1%  
 
Another question looked at a further sign of event impact, asking participants 
“Did participation in this event change your views on the issues in any way?” 
The answers shown in Table 4 do show some significant impact: although no 
one indicated that their views had changed ‘considerably’ (which would not be 
expected in a set of expert stakeholders) between a quarter to a half suggested 
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that they had changed their views at least ‘a little’, with around a quarter to a 
third at each event declaring that they had not changed their views in any way. 
On the whole, this suggests that some of the information being exchanged 
within the workshops was compelling – indeed, an open question additionally 
asked: “What information (from speakers, from written material, from other 
participants, etc.) did you think was particularly influential on your views?” 
Respondents gave a wide variety of answers to this across the events, which 
tended to be of one of two types: some cited a particular medium of 
communication (either general or specific) as of main influence, whereas others 
cited a particular piece of information as key. Occasionally the initial 
presentations were noted as highly influential (or the speakers who gave them), 
or the group discussions were cited instead (or the views of ‘other participants’ 
within these). In terms of specific pieces of information that were influential, 
these included information on different countries’ perceptions/ priorities and 
information about stakeholder engagement/public involvement.  
 
Finally here, one question asked: “Do you think this event will have any 
influence on relations between nuclear industry and society?” Here, there was a 
curious imbalance across the events: most of those at Barcelona and even 
London answered ‘yes’ or were unsure, whereas respondents from Munich 
were far more sceptical: not one answered ‘yes’, and respondents were 
essentially split between those that were ‘unsure’ and those that thought no 
influence would occur. An open aspect to this question asked respondents to 
explain their responses. One of the main issues of concern was the uncertain 
‘channels of influence’ from this project to policy makers, or as one put it, ‘it 
depends on how the final output will be delivered to whom’, or as another noted, 
it will ‘depend to some degree on (the) target audience for results and 
conclusions and on how they are communicated, published - (whether) widely 
or not.’ This view was expressed by participants from all three events. Other 
concerns from Munich in particular were that there were imbalances in those 
present that might undermine influence – such as too many German 
stakeholders (or indeed, inappropriate German stakeholders, with important 
experts being deterred because the event was in English), and too few 
representatives of industry (who would need to be involved). One respondent 
also noted sceptically that ‘nuclear energy is a very complex subject which is 
mostly held on an emotional level… facts are often not taken into account.’ On 
the positive side, a couple of respondents, though questioning the potential 
influence of their workshop, did suggest that the project as a whole might still 
have influence.  
 
In summary, the workshops had various impacts on participants in the sense of 
providing them with new knowledge, while a significant proportion suggested 
that their minds had been changed to some degree. In terms of impact on wider 
policy, this, of course, cannot be judged at this point, and respondents’ views 
were in the part conditional (i.e. it might have impact under certain conditions). 
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The ultimate impact of this process on policy making cannot be determined in 
this short evaluation, but is ultimately needed to help judge the overall success 
of the HONEST project. 
 
The questions in the participant questionnaire discussed so far are informed by 
a theoretical concept as to what makes a good stakeholder or public dialogue 
(essentially, good information translation), along with a concern about event 
influence (which is seen as the necessary outcome of good translation of public 
dialogue aims). However, it is useful to ask participants in their own words what 
they have found good and bad about an event, as this can reveal alternative 
conceptualisations of the ‘effectiveness’ issue. The questionnaire therefore 
included three additional open questions that asked “Overall, what was the best 
thing about the workshop?”, “Overall, what was the worst thing about the 
workshop?”, and “How do you think an event like this could be improved if 
something similar was run in the future?” 
 
There were a number of common themes in response to the ‘pros’ question - 
answered by most respondents and repeated over the three different events. 
These themes were:  
• Meeting/debating with people with different views (the interdisciplinarity 
of stakeholders) 
• Brainstorming/thinking of new things 
• The focus on openness 
• Different aspects of the process (the HONEST video, backcasting, the 
‘river of life’, and particularly the group discussions) 
• Catching up with an existing network 
• Learning/hearing certain facts/perspectives (e.g. ‘best practice 
principles’, the history of UK nuclear power, short country reports) 
 
Interestingly, these issues generally speak to learning, the exchange of 
information, the processes by which information exchange was enabled, and 
the nature of the people (information sources) involved – all of which concepts 
easily overlap with the ‘information translation’ perspective taken in this 
evaluation.  
 
With respect to the cons, slightly fewer responses were attained, but these were 
of a greater variety than the ‘pros’ and seemed more specific to the different 
workshops. The negative themes noted (with event location in brackets) were: 
 
• The need to move around for the group sessions (Barcelona) 
• Too diverse and not concrete enough (Barcelona) 
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• Difficult to image the future (Barcelona) 
• Too focused on ideals without recognising (societal) realities (Barcelona) 
• Lack of clarity about overall purpose and outcomes (London) 
• Discontinuity between the dissemination and workshop elements 
(London) 
• One person dominating discussion/ ‘interfering’ with opposed arguments 
(London) 
• Non-relevant contributions (London) 
• Not enough discussion of nuclear ‘proliferation’/disarmament (London) 
• Unclear at the outset that discussions would focus on Germany/too 
German orientated (Munich) 
• No milk for the coffee (Munich) 
• Too little time to design energy futures (Munich) 
• Not enough information on findings of HONEST (Munich) 
Several of these points are about practical issues (coffee, moving between 
rooms) that in a way are gratifying (if these were the worst things about the 
events, then the events must have been quite good!), but most, once more, 
refer to issues related to information and the context of its exchange – that is, 
concerning time limitations, lack of specificity, too much or too little information 
on a particular topic, disruptive individuals, and so on. Arguably, two main 
conclusions can be drawn from this list: the first is that the information 
translation perspective is an apt one to use for evaluating engagement, and the 
second is that participants generally had few complaints about the events in 
which they took part (which mirrors the previous generally positive evaluations).  
 
With regards to how to improve the workshops, the suggestion made largely 
followed on from identified criticisms, and will not be discussed in any detail 
here. However, for reference, and to help inform the design and conduct of 
similar events in future, the suggestions were: 
 
• Involve more stakeholders from large industries, as well as decision 
makers at a local, regional, national and international level (more 
diversity of participants) (Barcelona, Munich) 
• More time e.g. over a second day (Barcelona, London, Munich) 
• More/clearer information about aims at an earlier time (Barcelona, 
London) 
• More information on profiles of attendees before the event, and 
information on their motivation to attend (Barcelona, London) 
• Make more focused (Barcelona, London)  
• Concentrate on history, not future (London) 
• Language translation (from English) so more appropriate stakeholders 
can be involved (Munich) 
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• Include more countries (Munich) 
Discussion 
This brief report describes a small evaluation of the three stakeholder 
engagement events conducted in HONEST as part of WP6 (including the 
backcasting exercises of WP5). Because the evaluation has not been 
conducted by an independent third party, it has been deliberately restricted to 
participant views as collected through a questionnaire completed by 
approximately two-thirds of the participants from the three events – i.e. without 
third party commentary or analysis. Such an approach can, in itself, be 
problematic, as it relies upon the opinions of people who may not necessarily 
appreciate the background to an event or its limitations (such as temporal and 
financial). Furthermore, the reader needs to recognise that participants are not 
necessarily omniscient or fair in their assessments. People can be short-
sighted, opinionated, distracted, ignorant, political, and even just unpleasant. 
Thus, to read too much into negative responses from one or two individuals 
(participants) would be inappropriate. However, when a number of participants 
come up with similar arguments, then it is as least worth considering what their 
issues are and what might be done about them! In the current case, however, 
there seems little to fear: the three different workshops were generally well 
received, seen as interesting opportunities to learn about the topic of nuclear 
energy and society - and to exchange views with stakeholders from different 
domains - in an open environment using a variety of interesting processes. 
Although a number of problems were noted, these did not seem to be major, 
and the organising team showed some learning throughout the event series, 
amending and improving the events from the first to the last – where they could! 
However, two significant issues will always bedevil events such as these: the 
first is simply that of time, as complex discussions invariably need, or could 
benefit from, much more time than busy and important stakeholders can 
conceivably give; and the second is the numbers and diversity of stakeholders 
attending, the recruitment of which is plagued by various practical difficulties – 
not least identifying relevant, well-resourced, diverse stakeholder who 
coincidentally can attend a particular event at a particular time. These issues, 
however, are not unique to HONEST and its interests, and play a role in limiting 
the efficacy of most, if not all, significant pieces of stakeholder engagement. 
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Appendix 1: Evaluation Questionnaire 
 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for having taken part in the workshop. We would now like to ask you 
a few questions about it as part of our evaluation of this project; we would be 
extremely grateful if you could complete this questionnaire. Please be assured 
that your responses will be treated anonymously. Although we ask for your 
name below, this is just so that we can make contact with you again for the 
evaluation (with your permission). Your name will not be cited in any evaluation 
report or associated with any comment you make here. 
Thanks for your cooperation. 
 
1. What is your name?  
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. What is your affiliation?  
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
3. Was it clear from the information you were sent prior to the event what 
the workshop was about? 
 
Yes    
No   
Unsure  
 
4. At the start of the workshop, were the aims clearly specified? 
 
Yes    
No   
Unsure  
 
5. Was it clear to you from the information you were sent prior to the event 
why YOU were invited? 
 
Yes    
No   
Unsure  
 
6. Was it made clear to you how the participants for this event were 
selected? 
Yes    
No   
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Unsure  
 
7. Do you think the audience was appropriate for this event?  
Yes    
No   
Unsure  
 
If there were there any notable absentees, who were these? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
8. During the event, did you have the opportunity to have your say? 
I said all I wanted to say      
I said most of what I wanted to say     
I was only able to say a little of what I wanted to say  
I didn’t get a chance to say anything     
 
9. Was there sufficient time to discuss all that needed to be discussed? 
Yes    
No   
Unsure  
 
10. Do you think there were any significant issues that were NOT discussed, 
but which should have been? What were these? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
11. Were there any significant issues raised at the workshop that were not 
resolved? If so, what issues were these? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
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12. Did you learn much from the workshop? 
I learnt a lot of new things    
I learnt a few new things    
I’m not sure I learnt anything new  
No, I did not learn anything new   
 
13. Did participation in this event change your views on the issues in any 
way? 
Yes, I changed my views considerably    
Yes, I changed my views to some degree   
I’m not sure whether I changed my views or not  
No, I did not change my views in any way   
 
14. What information (from speakers, from written material, from other 
participants, etc.) did you think was particularly influential on your views? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………….
..........................………………………………………………………………… 
 
15. Do you think the summing-up accurately reflected what was discussed at 
the workshop?  
 
Yes       
No      
Unsure     
There was no summing up  
 
If not, what do you think was missed or misconstrued? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
16. Overall, do you think the workshop was well run? 
 
Yes    
No   
Unsure  
If you said ‘no’, what was the main problem? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
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……………………………….……………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………….………
……………………………………………………………………………………
………………………… 
 
 
17. How satisfied were you with the event overall? 
Very satisfied      
Fairly satisfied     
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied   
Not very satisfied      
Not at all satisfied     
Unsure      
 
 
18. Do you expect any feedback from the event? 
Yes    
No   
Unsure  
 
 
19. Did the event live up to your expectations?  
Yes    
No   
Unsure  
If not, why not? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………
………………………….…………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………….……………
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………….…………………………………………………… 
 
20. Do you think this event will have any influence on relations between 
nuclear industry and society? 
Yes    
No   
Unsure  
Please explain your response. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………
………………………….…………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………….……………
……………………………………………………………………………………
………………………….………………………………………………………… 
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21. Overall, what was the best thing about the workshop? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………
………………………….…………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………….……………
……………………………………………………………………………………
…………………….………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………….…………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
………………………….………… 
 
 
 
22. Overall, what was the worst thing about the workshop? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………
………………………….…………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………….……………
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………….……………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………….………
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………. 
 
23. How do you think an event like this could be improved if something 
similar was run in the future? 
……………………………………………………………………………………
………………………….…………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………….……………
……………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………….………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………….…………
……………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………….… 
 
 
Once again, thank you for your time. Please hand your completed questionnaire 
to the event organizer when you leave. 
 
 
 
 
END OF QUESTIONNAIRE  
